China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
Arquivado em: Uncategorized | Tags: América Latina, China, Política Externa
Deixe um comentário The Chinese government launched its first ever policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean region. The full text of the policy paper is as follows:
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
Foreword
The world today is undergoing major transformation and adjustment. Peace and development are the trend of the times. The move toward multi-polarity is irreversible and economic globalization is gaining momentum. World peace and development are facing new opportunities as well as various challenges. It is in the fundamental interest of people of all countries and also their common aspiration to share development opportunities, jointly address challenges and promote the noble cause of peace and development of mankind.
As the largest developing country in the world, China is committed to the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. It is ready to carry out friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity.
Latin American and Caribbean countries are an important part of the developing world and a major force in the international arena. Under new circumstances, the development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries is faced with new opportunities. In issuing this policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, the Chinese Government aims to further clarify the goals of China’s policy in this region, outline the guiding principles for future cooperation between the two sides in various fields and sustain the sound, steady and all-round growth of China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.
I. The Status and Role of Latin America and The Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean have a long history, vast territory and abundant resources, and the region enjoys a good foundation for economic and social growth and huge development potential.
Countries in the region have been actively exploring development paths suited to their national conditions. They have maintained political stability and continued economic growth, and the life of the people is steadily improving. Latin American and Caribbean countries cherish a strong desire for self-development through unity and the commitment to promoting regional peace, stability and development. The region on the whole is growing in strength and its international influence is rising. Latin American and Caribbean countries have taken an active part in international affairs and contributed significantly to world peace and common development. They are playing an increasingly important role in regional and international affairs.
II. China’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean
Though China and Latin America and the Caribbean are far from each other, the two peoples enjoy a time-honored friendship. The two sides are at a similar stage of development and face the common task of achieving development. Both sides cherish the desire for greater mutual understanding and closer cooperation.
During the twenty years or so after the founding of New China in 1949, China and Latin America and the Caribbean mainly conducted people-to-people exchanges. In the 1970s and 1980s, China established diplomatic ties with most countries in the region. Friendly cooperation between the two sides in various fields registered momentous growth in the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the two sides have enjoyed more frequent high-level exchanges, stronger political mutual trust and closer cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, culture and education, and mutual support and close coordination in international affairs. New progress has been made in relations between the two sides in an all-round way at various levels and across a broad spectrum of areas.
Friendly cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean serves the fundamental interest of the two peoples. Future growth of relationship between the two sides enjoys great potential and broad prospects, and will contribute more significantly to peace and development of mankind.
III. China’s Policy on Latin America and the Caribbean
To enhance solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries is the cornerstone of China’s independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese Government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plane and seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The goals of China’s policy on Latin America and the Caribbean are:
– Promote mutual respect and mutual trust and expand common ground. Based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China and Latin America and the Caribbean will treat each other as equals and respect each other. They will strengthen dialogue and communication, enhance political mutual trust, expand strategic common ground, and continue to show understanding and support on issues involving each other’s core interests and major concerns.
– Deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results. The two sides will leverage their respective strengths, tap the potential of cooperation, and seek to become each other’s partner in economic cooperation and trade for mutual benefit and common development.
– Draw on each other’s strengths to boost common progress and intensify exchanges. The two sides will carry out more cultural and people-to-people exchanges, learn from each other and jointly promote development and progress of human civilization.
– The one China principle is the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries and regional organizations. The overwhelming majority of countries in the region are committed to the one China policy and the position of supporting China’s reunification and not having official ties or contacts with Taiwan. The Chinese Government appreciates such a stance. China is ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with all Latin American and Caribbean countries based on the one China principle.
IV. Strengthen China’s Comprehensive Cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean Region
1. In the Political Field
(1) High-Level Exchanges
China wishes to maintain the momentum of close exchanges with leaders of Latin American and Caribbean countries to increase mutual understanding and trust, step up exchange of experience on governance and consolidate the political basis for the growth of relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
(2) Exchanges Between Legislatures
The National People’s Congress of China wishes to strengthen friendly exchanges with parliaments of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Latin American Parliament, the Mercosur Parliament, the Andean Parliament, etc. at multiple levels and through various channels on the basis of respecting each other, deepening mutual understanding and promoting cooperation so as to enrich and invigorate relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
(3) Exchanges Between Political Parties
The Communist Party of China wishes to carry out friendly exchanges of various forms with political parties and organizations of Latin American and Caribbean countries on the basis of independence, full equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs to learn from each other, increase mutual understanding and friendship, and strengthen mutual trust and cooperation.
(4) Consultation Mechanisms
Relevant agencies of the Chinese Government wish to establish and improve the mechanisms of standing committee, high-level committee, high-level mixed committee, strategic dialogue, political consultation, mixed committee on economy and trade, consultation on economy and trade, high-level working group, business cooperation forum, cultural and education mixed committee, and science and technology committee with their counterparts in Latin America and the Caribbean to increase consultation and promote exchanges and cooperation.
(5) Cooperation in International Affairs
The Chinese Government will continue to strengthen coordination and cooperation on international issues with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and maintain regular consultation with them on major international and regional issues. The two sides will continue to support each other on such important issues as sovereignty and territorial integrity. China stands ready to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to strengthen the role of the United Nations, make the international political and economic order more fair and equitable, promote democracy in international relations and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. China supports a greater role of Latin American and Caribbean countries in international affairs.
(6) Local Government Exchanges
The Chinese side highly values exchanges at the local government level with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It supports the twinning of provinces/states or cities between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries, and exchanges and cooperation in business, science and technology, culture and other fields to increase mutual understanding and friendship. It attaches great importance to cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in international local governments organizations.
2. In the Economic Field
(1) Trade
The Chinese Government will continue to work with its Latin American and Caribbean counterparts in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit to expand and balance two-way trade and improve the trade structure to achieve common development. At the same time, it will work with these countries to properly settle trade frictions through consultation and cooperation. China will, on the basis of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, give positive consideration to concluding free trade agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries or regional integration organizations.
(2) Investment Cooperation
The Chinese Government encourages and supports qualified Chinese companies with good reputation in investing in manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, energy, mineral resources, infrastructure, and service sector in Latin America and the Caribbean to promote the economic and social development of both sides. The Chinese Government will continue to welcome investment by Latin American and Caribbean businesses in China.
(3) Financial Cooperation
The Chinese Government supports China’s monetary and financial regulatory authorities and financial institutions in stepping up consultation and professional exchanges and cooperation on macroeconomic situation and economic and financial policies with their counterparts in Latin American and Caribbean countries. It encourages Chinese commercial banks to set up branches in Latin America and the Caribbean. It will push for the conclusion of banking regulatory cooperation agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries as appropriate, and work with them to jointly combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
(4) Agricultural Cooperation
The Chinese Government will promote exchanges and cooperation in agricultural science and technology with Latin American and Caribbean countries through holding agricultural technique training programs and dispatching technicians to the Latin American and Caribbean region. An information exchange mechanism will be established to discuss issues of common interest. Cooperation in flora and fauna inspection will be intensified and agricultural trade will be expanded to jointly uphold food security.
(5) Industrial Cooperation
The Chinese side wishes to strengthen exchanges with Latin American and Caribbean countries in industry. It is desirable to establish and improve relevant cooperation mechanisms, share best practices in each other’s industrialization process, and promote and deepen practical cooperation.
(6) Infrastructure Construction
The Chinese side will strengthen practical cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in transport, information and communications, water conservancy and hydropower and other areas of infrastructure development, scale up project contracting in the region, and conduct mutually beneficial cooperation in various ways so as to contribute its share to further infrastructure development in the region.
(7) Resources and Energy Cooperation
The Chinese side wishes to expand and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in resources and energy within bilateral cooperation frameworks.
(8) Customs Cooperation
The Chinese side wishes to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries on customs by increasing exchanges between customs officers of the two sides and promoting trade security and facilitation. Exchanges and consultation will be increased on issues of mutual concern, such as smuggling and business fraud. Negotiations aimed at concluding documents on mutual administrative assistance with customs authorities of relevant countries will be held in due course.
(9) Cooperation on Quality Inspection
The Chinese Government wishes to step up exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries on quality inspection, technical barriers to trade (WTO/TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (WTO/SPS), and establish and improve consultation mechanisms on quality inspection to ensure product quality and food safety. The two sides will strengthen exchanges and consultation on issues of mutual interest such as product quality, food safety, and quarantine of entry animals and plants, leading to the signing of protocols on quarantine of entry products. They will also conduct active exchanges and cooperation on measurement and standardization.
(10) Tourism Cooperation
The Chinese side will expand tourism cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The Chinese side will make vigorous efforts to promote visits by Chinese tourist groups to Latin American and Caribbean countries. It also welcomes citizens of Latin American and Caribbean countries to visit China.
(11) Debt Reduction and Cancellation
The Chinese Government will, based on its consistent policy on debt reduction and cancellation, discuss with relevant Latin American and Caribbean countries ways to relieve their debts as China’s ability permits. The Chinese Government will also continue to call upon the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more concrete steps to reduce and cancel debts owed by Latin American and Caribbean countries.
(12) Economic and Technical Assistance
The Chinese Government will, according to its financial capability and level of economic and social development, continue to provide economic and technical assistance to relevant Latin American and Caribbean countries without attaching any political conditions. The Chinese Government will work within its ability and gradually increase its assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to meet their needs.
(13) Multilateral Cooperation
The Chinese Government is ready to strengthen consultation and coordination with Latin American and Caribbean countries in multilateral trade and financial institutions and regimes, with a view to promoting South-South cooperation, bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring a bigger say and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in international trade and financial affairs.
(14) Chamber-of-Commerce Cooperation
The Chinese side will deepen its cooperation with chambers of commerce of Latin America and the Caribbean and push forward exchanges between business communities of the two sides through the China-Latin America Entrepreneur Summit, China-Caribbean Entrepreneurs Meeting and other mechanisms, in an effort to achieve win-win results.
3. In the Cultural and Social Aspects
(1) Cultural and Sports Exchanges
The Chinese Government will work actively to follow up on cultural cooperation agreements and relevant implementation programs signed with Latin American and Caribbean countries, maintain regular exchange of visits between cultural authorities of the two sides, and strengthen interaction and cooperation between cultural and art institutions and professionals of the two sides. To meet the needs for cultural exchange and market demand, the two sides will provide guidance for and push forward a variety of cultural exchange programs among various communities of the two sides.
The Chinese side will keep the momentum of exchanges between the sports authorities and national Olympic committees, and encourage direct contacts between sports associations of the two sides. Guidance and encouragement will also be given to bilateral sports exchanges in various forms.
(2) Cooperation in Science, Technology and Education
The Chinese side is ready to enhance scientific and technological exchanges with Latin American and Caribbean countries through the mixed committee on bilateral science and technology cooperation and high-level coordinating mechanism. The Chinese side will also strengthen cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean in aeronautics and astronautics, bio-fuel, resources and environment technology, marine technology and other areas of shared interest. The Chinese side will promote wider application of Chinese technologies on energy-conservation, digital medical treatment, small hydropower and other results of scientific research and advanced applied techniques in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Chinese side will provide Latin American and Caribbean countries with technical training, services and demonstration, and step up cooperation and exchanges on the educational front with Latin American and Caribbean countries through bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. The Chinese side will work for the conclusion of the agreement on mutual recognition of diplomas and academic degrees, and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
(3) Cooperation in Medical and Health Care
The Chinese Government will vigorously promote exchanges and cooperation in the medical and health care sector with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and share experience and carry out cooperation in such areas as disease control, response to public health emergencies, and control of HIV/AIDS and bird flu. The Chinese Government will continue to send medical contingents equipped with necessary medicines and medical equipments to relevant countries to help improve local medical facilities and train local medical professionals.
(4) Consular Cooperation and Personnel Exchanges
The Chinese Government will develop and deepen consular relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and strengthen and expand exchanges and cooperation between the consular departments of the two sides. The Chinese Government will carry out bilateral or multilateral friendly discussions with Latin American and Caribbean countries on consular issues of shared interest to address each other’s concerns through the establishment of a consular consultation mechanism. The Chinese Government will take effective measures to promote and safeguard regular personnel exchanges between the two sides, facilitate normal trade, investment and business activities and uphold the lawful rights and interests of people of the two sides.
(5) Media Cooperation
The Chinese Government encourages and actively promotes exchanges and cooperation between the media of the two sides at multiple levels and in various forms to increase mutual understanding and ensure comprehensive and unbiased reports of each other. It will work to increase communication and cooperation between government information departments of the two sides and provide convenience for media interaction and cooperation between the two sides.
(6) People-to-People Exchanges
The Chinese Government encourages exchanges between non-governmental organizations and academic institutions of the two sides and gives full play to the role of the mechanism for people-to-people friendly interaction in advancing friendly relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries. It will strengthen interaction with youth organizations and institutions of Latin American and Caribbean countries, and deepen friendly cooperation with women’s organizations at the national, regional and non-governmental levels in Latin American and Caribbean countries, so as to build up mutual understanding and mutual trust and work together for gender equality and the advancement of women.
(7) Cooperation in Environmental Protection
The Chinese side will strengthen exchanges with Latin American and Caribbean countries in laws, regulations and policies related to environmental protection and promote cooperation in personnel training, education and capacity building in the fields of biodiversity conservation, as well as prevention and treatment of pollution and desertification.
(8) Cooperation in Combating Climate Change
The Chinese Government highly values its cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in combating climate change and is ready to develop and consolidate bilateral cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other relevant mechanisms. It will actively promote consultation and communication between the two sides on combating climate change and cooperation in related projects.
(9) Cooperation in Human Resources and Social Security
The Chinese side will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in employment promotion, establishment of good labor relations, improvement of the social security system, human resources development and reform of the civil service system. It will, through the signing and implementation of memoranda of understanding on bilateral cooperation, deepen and expand bilateral exchanges in social aspects, and enhance coordination and cooperation between the two sides in international organizations such as the International Labor Organization.
(10) Disaster Reduction, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance
The Chinese Government will enhance information sharing, experience exchanges and technological cooperation in disaster reduction and relief with Latin American and Caribbean countries and facilitate the establishment of regular bilateral and multilateral meeting mechanisms between relevant departments of the two sides. It will continue to respond positively to the need for urgent humanitarian assistance of Latin American and Caribbean countries. It will encourage non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross Society of China to conduct exchanges and cooperation with relevant Latin American and Caribbean organizations in this regard.
(11) Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation
The Chinese Government will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in reducing poverty and narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and will encourage poverty alleviation institutions of the two sides to establish broad cooperative relations to share information and conduct joint research. More training programs designed for poverty alleviation personnel in Latin American and Caribbean countries will be launched, while more interaction on poverty reduction with inter-state or regional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean will be strengthened. The two sides will also enhance exchange of visits and mutual participation in conferences and for a on poverty alleviation held by the other side.
4. On Peace, Security and Judicial Affairs
(1) Military Exchanges and Cooperation
The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides as well as personnel exchanges will be enhanced. Professional exchanges in military training, personnel training and peacekeeping will be deepened. Practical cooperation in the non-traditional security field will be expanded. The Chinese side will, as its ability permits, continue to provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and Caribbean countries.
(2) Cooperation in Judicial and Police Affairs
The Chinese side will steadily expand its cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in judicial affairs, judicial assistance in criminal and civil matters and extradition in particular. Cooperation in information sharing, penalty enforcement and legal services will be strengthened. Concerted efforts in law enforcement involving the interior and police departments of relevant countries will be stepped up to jointly combat transnational organized crimes including drug crimes and economic crimes. Intelligence and technological exchanges will be strengthened, with bilateral and multilateral exchange mechanisms put in place, so as to share information on illegal immigration and improve the capacity for its prevention.
(3) Non-traditional Security Issues
The Chinese Government will further its exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries on non-traditional security issues by increasing information sharing and personnel exchanges and explore effective ways to deepen cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as combating terrorism, so as to jointly improve the capacity to respond to non-traditional security threats.
V. China’s Relations with Latin American and Caribbean Regional Organizations
The Chinese Government appreciates the important role of Latin American and Caribbean regional and sub-regional organizations in safeguarding peace and stability in the region, and promoting regional solidarity, development and integration. It supports these organizations in exerting their influence in regional and international affairs. The Chinese side will continue to strengthen communication, consultation and cooperation with relevant organizations in various fields.
Qué puede esperar Latinoamérica del próximo presidente de EEUU (ARI)
Arquivado em: Uncategorized | Tags: América Latina, Eleições norte-americanas
Deixe um comentário | Peter Hakim ARI 135/2008 (traducido del inglés) – 25/11/2008 |
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| Tema: ¿Qué puede esperar Latinoamérica del próximo presidente de EEUU, y qué puede esperar el próximo presidente de EEUU de Latinoamérica?
Resumen: Con los mercados financieros sumidos en el caos y los norteamericanos cada vez más preocupados por su futuro económico, no es sorprendente que las cuestiones de política exterior –incluidos la guerra de Irak y el terrorismo internacional– hayan quedados relegados a un segundo plano en la carrera presidencial norteamericana. Hace algunos meses, aprovechando el Día de la Independencia Cubana, tanto Barack Obama como John McCain pronunciaron importantes discursos acerca de Latinoamérica ante audiencias en Miami. John McCain llegó incluso a viajar a Colombia y México. Tras esto, la región desapareció prácticamente de las dos campañas durante varios meses. No fue hasta el último debate del 15 de octubre que los candidatos abordaron algunos temas claves referentes a las relaciones de EEUU con Latinoamérica –entre otros el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN, o NAFTA en inglés), el acuerdo comercial firmado pero no ratificado entre EEUU y Colombia, y el peligro de depender del petróleo importado de Venezuela–. Análisis Objetivos prioritarios Y eso podría no ser tan malo. Después de todo, la mejor forma que tiene Washington de favorecer los intereses de Latinoamérica es lograr reactivar la economía de EEUU –que es claramente la prioridad número uno de la política nacional del país–. Lo que más necesita la región de lo que puede ofrecer EEUU es un mercado en expansión para las exportaciones latinoamericanas y una fuente fiable de préstamos, inversiones y remesas. Una economía norteamericana fuerte, dinámica y abierta ayudará a reforzar la economía mundial, lo cual redundará también en beneficio de Latinoamérica. Otra preocupación clave para el próximo presidente de EEUU será poner orden en la fracasada política exterior heredada de Bush y restablecer la credibilidad de EEUU en todo el mundo. Esto también sería bien recibido en Latinoamérica, donde se ha extendido un sentimiento antiamericano provocado por la política exterior de Washington, incluyendo su agresivo unilateralismo, su abuso del recurso a la fuerza militar y el empleo de la tortura. Barack Obama tiene una clara ventaja a la hora de imprimir una nueva dirección y espíritu a la política exterior de EEUU. Es el candidato preferido, por amplio margen, en casi todos los países del mundo. También está, por así decirlo, limpio de culpa. Se opuso a la Guerra de Irak desde el principio y ha expresado en todo momento su compromiso con el diálogo, la negociación y el multilateralismo. Por el contrario, a McCain se le identifica, aunque a veces injustamente, con las posturas actuales de la Casa Blanca. El candidato republicano se ha manifestado enérgicamente en contra de la tortura y de otras políticas de Bush, pero sigue siendo un defensor entusiasta de la Guerra de Irak, y ha reclamado sistemáticamente las opciones militares para enfrentarse a desafíos como la intervención rusa en Georgia, las amenazas chinas sobre Taiwán y el riesgo de que Irán se convierta en un poder nuclear. Da la impresión de que, en las situaciones críticas, su instinto es recurrir a la fuerza más que a la negociación. Es demasiado pronto para predecir hacia dónde se dirige la crisis financiera mundial. Se comprenden mal sus causas y se desconocen hasta dónde puede llegar. Nadie sabe aún cuáles son los remedios apropiados. Sin embargo, Obama podría tener también ventaja sobre McCain a la hora de abordar los problemas y reparar los daños. Está claro que cualquier solución requerirá una respuesta que implique la colaboración internacional y Obama sería el socio mejor recibido en casi cualquier parte. Es cierto que los demócratas tienen más objeciones que los republicanos a la globalización y al libre comercio, pero también es verdad que los demócratas están mucho menos comprometidos con la rígida ideología del libre mercado. Se sentirán más cómodos con una mayor participación del gobierno en la economía, una postura que facilitará la colaboración en asuntos financieros con Europa y el resto del mundo –si Obama está dispuesto a resistir la presión de su partido para que, una vez elegido presidente, se ocupe prioritariamente de los asuntos internos–. Más allá de las cuestiones financieras, las dos áreas de la política norteamericana que más preocupan a Latinoamérica hoy en día son la inmigración y el comercio. Estos son los dos puntos principales de la inacabada agenda de la Administración de Bush para la región. Es llamativo constatar que también se han convertido en dos puntos fundamentales en la agenda europea respecto a Latinoamérica. Por desgracia, los sentimientos aislacionistas de la opinión pública norteamericana dificultarán enormemente el progreso en ambos frentes, sea quien sea el nuevo presidente tras las elecciones de noviembre. Inmigración Comercio El próximo año, ganen o no la presidencia, los demócratas ampliarán su mayoría en ambas cámaras del Congreso. Ello significa que el acuerdo no será ratificado, probablemente ni siquiera votado, a menos que se realicen cambios en el texto y que Colombia se comprometa a mejorar la situación de los derechos humanos en su país. Pero una vez introducidos esos cambios y compromisos, es probable (aunque no seguro) que tanto Obama como McCain encuentren el modo de asegurar la ratificación de los acuerdos con Colombia y Panamá. Es difícil imaginar cómo podría EEUU denegar el estatus de libre comercio a un aliado esencial como Colombia, cuando lo aprueba con otros muchos países. Otras cuestiones comerciales más amplias para el próximo presidente se centrarán en qué hacer con la casi agotada Ronda Doha de negociaciones comerciales multilaterales y qué puede hacerse (si es que se puede hacer algo) con el moribundo pacto comercial con todo el continente americano. McCain es a todas luces el defensor más firme de ambas cuestiones. Ha adoptado posiciones impopulares que harían avanzar ambas negociaciones, como oponerse a la mayoría de los subvenciones a la agricultura y exhortar a poner fin a los aranceles sobre las importaciones de etanol brasileño. Obama no ha aclarado su posición en algunos puntos comerciales importantes. Su problema es cómo salvar la distancia entre sus puntos de vista ortodoxos en economía y el rechazo que sienten la mayoría de sus seguidores demócratas y sindicales ante las nuevas iniciativas comerciales. Obama ha solicitado la revisión del TLCAN, pero pocos creen que vaya a tomar alguna medida para cambiar sustancialmente este acuerdo que ya tiene 15 años de vida. En principio, aprueba una ampliación del comercio pero es impreciso a la hora de explicar qué está dispuesto a hacer en la práctica. Obama y McCain, curiosamente, coinciden en la necesidad de favorecer programas asistenciales más generosos para los trabajadores que pierden sus empleos a causa del comercio exterior. Más que nada, esta ayuda de ajuste comercial es esencial para conseguir el apoyo de ambos partidos a los nuevos acuerdos comerciales y podría ser el punto desde donde la próxima administración debería de empezar a definir su política comercial. Los desafíos bilaterales Venezuela Obama y McCain tienen recetas políticas muy distintas para tratar con Venezuela. El discurso de McCain acerca de Latinoamérica recuerda a la retórica de la Guerra Fría. Considera a Latinoamérica como una región de adversarios y aliados –y a su juicio la primera tarea de Washington es movilizar y ayudar a estos últimos para que se enfrenten a los primeros, liderados por Venezuela–. Este fue el instinto político inicial de Bush, pero fracasó en su intento porque no tuvo en cuenta la creciente complejidad e independencia de Latinoamérica. Pasó por alto el hecho de que la mayoría de los países de la región, incluidos los mejores aliados de EEUU, no sólo quieren evitar enfrentarse a la agresiva y rica en petróleo Venezuela, también quieren mantener buenas relaciones económicas y políticas con este país. Obama parece más inclinado a seguir el planteamiento más reciente del gobierno de Bush, que ha moderado mucho sus respuestas a las bufonadas y amenazas de Chávez, y ha dejado de presionar a otros países para que restrinjan sus relaciones o se opongan a Venezuela. Obama ha afirmado también que, en las circunstancias adecuadas, estaría dispuesto a entablar un diálogo con Chávez. Pero la próxima Administración norteamericana podría verse obligada a compensar o neutralizar la influencia de Venezuela –por ejemplo ofreciendo ayuda a más países de Latinoamérica para afrontar sus problemas más graves, incluyendo el precio todavía elevado de la energía y los alimentos, las crecientes preocupaciones sobre seguridad y los daños que va a provocar la crisis financiera–. Pero ello exigirá recursos y compromiso político, dos cosas que no abundarán gane quien gane las elecciones. México EEUU poco puede hacer respecto a estos problemas, sea quien sea el próximo presidente. Principalmente será México quien tenga que resolverlos. En 1995, durante otra crisis mexicana, EEUU aportó una buena parte de un paquete de rescate de 50.000 millones de dólares; esto sería imposible ahora dada la situación de crisis que vive EEUU. Los fondos norteamericanos destinados al Plan Mérida pueden ofrecer alguna ayuda a México para enfrentarse a los problemas asociados con el crimen organizado y las drogas ilegales, pero la mayor parte de los recursos y de la determinación política tendrán que venir de México. Desde luego, EEUU podría hacer mucho más para tratar de poner coto a la venta de armas estadounidenses a criminales mexicanos y gastar más en reducir la demanda de drogas ilegales. Pero reiteramos que lo mejor que puede hacer EEUU por México (y por el resto de Latinoamérica) es poner en orden su economía y sus finanzas. Las autoridades mexicanas no están particularmente entusiasmadas por ninguno de los dos candidatos. La imagen de McCain se ha visto seriamente empañada por su giro respecto a la reforma sobre la inmigración y su apoyo reiterado a aplicar una mayor firmeza a la hora de hacer cumplir las leyes de inmigración, incluyendo la construcción de un infame muro en la frontera entre EEUU y México. Por su parte, las virulentas críticas de Obama al TLCAN y sus llamamientos para que se renegocie suenan a veces a desprecio hacia México. Centroamérica y el Caribe Haití Cuba Brasil Para mantener una relación constructiva con Brasil, EEUU tiene que aceptar la política exterior independiente de este país y asumir las diferencias de intereses y perspectivas entre ambos países. La Administración Bush logró hacer esto bastante bien, hasta el punto de que altos cargos brasileños aseguran que las relaciones entre EEUU y Brasil son las mejores que han tenido nunca. Por su temperamento, Obama parece más capaz que McCain de aceptar la ambigüedad y la tolerancia que requieren las buenas relaciones con Brasil, pero ésta no será una tarea fácil para la próxima administración norteamericana. Conclusiones: Tanto Obama como McCain reconocen que las relaciones de EEUU con Latinoamérica se han deteriorado gravemente en los últimos años. Ambos candidatos –al igual que casi todo el mundo en Washington– han reclamado un “liderazgo renovado de EEUU” y un “mayor compromiso” en la región. Pero no parece probable que ninguno de los dos candidatos introduzca cambios políticos fundamentales. EEUU se ha vuelto una nación cada vez más insegura y podría centrarse más en sí misma que nunca hasta ahora. Por otro lado, es improbable que Latinoamérica figure entre las máximas prioridades de la política exterior norteamericana. La atención y los recursos de Washington se centrarán seguramente en otras regiones y asuntos. Pero, tristemente, esto podría no importar demasiado a Latinoamérica. La mayor parte de los países de la región han dejado de mirar hacia EEUU en busca de liderazgo o de un compromiso global. En algunas cuestiones, la mayoría de los gobiernos desearía que EEUU redujese su implicación. Piensan que pueden valerse por sí mismos. Brasil y otros países latinoamericanos han respondido con habilidad a dos conflictos recientes en la región –un enfrentamiento interno en Bolivia y el estallido ocurrido hace varios meses entre Ecuador, Colombia y Venezuela–. Pocos gobiernos latinoamericanos buscan una mayor implicación de EEUU en cuestiones como la promoción de la democracia o incluso el desarrollo social. Estos son desafíos que a su juicio pueden resolver sin necesidad de la ayuda de EEUU. Aún así, hay áreas en los que muchos países agradecerían un mayor compromiso –por ejemplo en cooperación comercial y cuestiones económicas (pese a la debacle financiera sufrida por EEUU), o en sus esfuerzos por luchar contra el crimen organizado–. La próxima Administración en Washington acertará si es selectiva en cómo, dónde y en qué cuestiones se involucra en Latinoamérica. Para asumir los cambios en la región, en EEUU y en todo el mundo, el nuevo presidente necesitará un enfoque más considerado y moderado en su política en Latinoamérica y el Caribe. Peter Hakim |
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Democracia à moda russa em nova fase
http://www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20080706/not_imp201288,0.php
Henry Kissinger*
Tamanho do texto? A A A A
Em primeiro lugar, a estrutura de poder emergente em Moscou parece mais complexa do que sugere a sabedoria convencional. Ainda não se sabe ao certo por que Putin, no auge de uma popularidade que lhe teria permitido emendar a Constituição para prorrogar seu mandato, optou pelo caminho complexo e incerto de se tornar primeiro-ministro.
Minha impressão é que a política russa está vivendo uma nova fase. A mudança do escritório de Putin do Kremlin para o edifício que abriga o governo russo é simbólica. Medvedev declarou que pretende presidir o Conselho de Segurança Nacional e cumprir o item constitucional que confere ao presidente o planejamento da política externa.
A declaração de que o presidente planeja a política externa e de segurança, e o premiê implementa partes dela, tornou-se o mantra das autoridades russas. Não encontrei nenhum russo, dentro ou fora do governo, que duvidasse da existência de algum tipo de redistribuição de poder, embora ninguém tenha expressado certezas sobre o seu resultado.
LÍDER PÓS-CAOS
Putin continua poderoso e influente. Ele é visto pela maioria dos russos como o líder que superou a humilhação e o caos dos anos 90, quando o Estado, a economia, a ideologia e o império soviético desmoronaram.
É provável que Putin tenha atribuído a si o acompanhamento vigilante do desempenho de seu sucessor. É possível que ele esteja mantendo aberta a opção de ser candidato numa futura eleição presidencial. Seja como for, a eleição russa marca a transição de uma fase de consolidação para a de modernização.
A cessão voluntária do poder por um governante que não estava sendo compelido a fazê-lo é um acontecimento sem precedente na história russa. A crescente complexidade da economia criou a necessidade de procedimentos legais previsíveis, como já foi sugerido por Medvedev.
A operação do governo com dois centros de poder pode parecer o início de uma evolução para uma forma de limitações e contrapesos, algo que não existia até agora.
A evolução para uma forma russa de democracia não está predeterminada, é claro, e as motivações para ela não foram produzidas necessariamente por reflexões teóricas sobre a natureza da democracia. Mas isso tampouco aconteceu na evolução democrática do Ocidente.Que implicações isso tem para a política externa americana? Nos próximos meses, a Rússia estará ocupada estabelecendo os meios práticos de distinção entre projeto e implementação de uma política nacional de segurança. O governo de George W. Bush e a campanha presidencial americana seriam sábios se dessem à Rússia espaço para elaborar esses arranjos. No longo prazo, desde a extinção da União Soviética, em 1991, uma sucessão de governos americanos agiu como se a criação da democracia russa fosse tarefa dos americanos.
Os proponentes dessas políticas afirmam que a transformação da sociedade russa é uma precondição para uma ordem internacional mais harmoniosa. Eles argumentam que, se a Rússia for mantida sob pressão, acabará implodindo, como ocorreu com a União Soviética. A política de intromissão naquilo que os russos consideram sua própria maneira de ser corre o risco de prejudicar tanto os objetivos geopolíticos como os morais.
Alguns grupos e indivíduos na Rússia vêem os EUA como catalisadores de uma evolução democrática mais acelerada. A maioria dos russos, porém, considera os americanos presunçosos e determinados a dificultar a recuperação do país. Um ambiente assim torna mais provável uma resposta nacionalista do que uma evolução democrática.
Seria uma pena se esse estado de espírito persistisse, porque estamos testemunhando um dos períodos mais promissores da Rússia. A exposição a sociedades abertas modernas e o engajamento com elas é mais prolongado e intenso do que em qualquer período anterior da história. Quanto mais tempo isso durar, mais impacto terá na evolução política do país.
RITMO PRÓPRIO
Os valores americanos nos obrigam a estar sempre comprometidos com uma evolução democrática, mas o ritmo desta será inevitavelmente russo. Nós influenciaremos mais tendo paciência do que adotando uma postura descompromissada e fazendo exortações públicas.
Isso é particularmente importante porque as realidades geopolíticas oferecem uma oportunidade incomum de cooperação entre antigos adversários. Em conjunto, EUA e Rússia controlam 90% do arsenal nuclear mundial. A Rússia é o país de maior massa territorial do planeta, fazendo fronteira com Europa, Ásia e Oriente Médio. O progresso rumo à estabilidade nuclear do Irã requer uma cooperação russo-americana ou seria facilitado por ela.
A política externa imperialista da Rússia czarista e da União Soviética foi facilitada pela fraqueza de quase todos os seus Estados fronteiriços. Isso permitiu que a Rússia avançasse, ao longo de um século e meio, quase como uma força natural, do Volga até o Elba, ao longo das praias do Mar Negro, entrando pelo Cáucaso, até as cercanias da Índia. Na Ásia, ela penetrou no Pacífico, na Mandchúria e na Coréia. O ímpeto russo foi ajudado pela natureza autoritária do Kremlin. Segurança se tornou sinônimo de expansão contínua e a legitimidade doméstica era alcançada, em grande parte, por uma demonstração de poder externo.
Essas condições se alteraram bastante. Os vizinhos da Rússia superaram a fraqueza que seduzia as aventuras do país. A fronteira de 4 mil quilômetros com a China é um desafio demográfico. Ao longo de uma fronteira igualmente longa, a Rússia tem de lidar com o islamismo militante, que estende seu alcance ao sul do país.
No oeste, fica a fronteira com o Ocidente, onde ela está diante da necessidade de se ajustar à perda de territórios identificados por centenas de anos com sua história. O alcance estratégico russo, porém, foi limitado pelas realidades emergentes, incluindo o ingresso na Otan de Estados que antes integravam o Pacto de Varsóvia.
Embora a população da Rússia esteja experimentando um crescimento do orgulho nacional, seus líderes compreendem o risco de alterar a nova ordem internacional por métodos tradicionais. Eles sabem que os 25 milhões de muçulmanos do país demonstram uma lealdade duvidosa ao Estado. O sistema de saúde precisa ser reformado. A infra-estrutura tem de ser reconstruída. Pela primeira vez, a Rússia sabe que está obrigada a se concentrar em uma reforma doméstica.
A despeito da retórica de confronto e do estilo agressivo que o país desenvolveu durante o período imperialista, os líderes russos estão conscientes de suas limitações. Na verdade, eu caracterizaria a política da Rússia sob Putin como impelida para a busca de um parceiro estratégico confiável, tendo os EUA como opção preferida.
A turbulenta retórica russa dos últimos anos reflete, em parte, a frustração com a nossa aparente impassibilidade diante dessa busca. Os dois presidentes criaram uma relação construtiva, mas não foram capazes de superar hábitos institucionais formados durante a Guerra Fria. As questões que dominam a agenda política dos dois países são segurança, Irã e a relação da Rússia com suas ex-repúblicas, especialmente a Ucrânia.
Por sua preponderância nuclear, Rússia e EUA têm a obrigação de assumir a liderança em questões nucleares globais. Têm surgido iniciativas construtivas, como uma maior transparência e a conexão de sistemas de defesa antibalísticos dos dois países, como se observou no comunicado emitido em abril em Sochi por Bush e Putin.Sobre a proliferação nuclear, quatro perguntas precisam ser respondidas: Rússia e EUA concordam a respeito da natureza do desafio imposto pela aquisição de armas nucleares pelo Irã? Concordam a respeito da situação do programa nuclear iraniano? Têm a mesma opinião sobre o uso da diplomacia para evitar o perigo? Estão de acordo sobre quais medidas tomar se a diplomacia fracassar?
Minha impressão é que um consenso está surgindo entre EUA e Rússia com relação às duas primeiras perguntas. Com relação às outras, os dois lados precisam ter em mente que nenhum deles é capaz de superar o desafio sozinho.
A questão das relações com a Ucrânia toca o cerne da percepção de ambos os lados a respeito da natureza dos assuntos internacionais. Os EUA, pondo em prática as lições da Guerra Fria, vêem a questão como a superação de uma ameaça militar em potencial. Para a Rússia, a questão é, sobretudo, chegar a bons termos com uma dolorosa sublevação histórica.
Uma genuína independência da Ucrânia é fundamental para um sistema internacional pacífico e deve ser apoiada pelos Estados Unidos. Criar laços estreitos entre a União Européia e a Ucrânia, incluindo a integração no bloco, é importante. Entretanto, o deslocamento do sistema de segurança ocidental do Rio Elba até as cercanias de Moscou traria de volta a questão do declínio russo de uma tal forma que poderia criar uma comoção capaz de inibir a solução das outras questões.
A declaração de Sochi, de Bush e Putin, delineou um mapa para um diálogo estratégico entre os dois lados. Cabe às novas administrações dar-lhe um contexto operacional.
TRADUÇÃO DE CELSO MAURO PACIORNIK
*Henry Kissinger, ex-secretário de Estado dos EUA, escreveu este artigo para ?Tribune Media Services?
Brazil: the natural knowledge-economy – DEMOS/CGEE
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Organização inglesa publica estudo sobre C&T no Brasil;
perspectivas são “especialmente brilhantes”, afirma relatório
O panorama da inovação no Brasil está mudando rapidamente; as perspectivas nesse campo são, no momento, “especialmente brilhantes”. A constatação aparece no relatórioBrazil: the natural knowledge-economy, lançado em Londres em 8 de julho. Elaborado pela organização inglesa DEMOS, com a participação do CGEE, o relatório faz parte do projeto Atlas das Idéias, iniciado pela think-tank em 2006.
O título Brazil: the natural knowledge-economy chama a atenção para uma singularidade nacional: o fato de a força da inovação no País se revelar com clareza nas atividades relacionadas aos recursos naturais – petróleo, ferro, agronegócio, com destaque para os biocombustíveis. “O sistema de inovação do País é em grande parte, mas não exclusivamente, construído sobre seus recursos naturais e ambientais”, explica o estudo. O caminho brasileiro, de acordo com Brazil: the natural knowledge- economy,contesta a visão para a qual as economias baseadas no conhecimento ou em recursos naturais ocupam extremos opostos no espectro do desenvolvimento econômico. No Brasil, afirma a organização, “a compet&e circ;ncia crescente em ciência e tecnologia não está separada, ou em oposição, aos recursos naturais, e sim integralmente ligada a eles”.
Ao longo de seis meses, em duas visitas ao Brasil, pesquisadores da Demos realizaram extensa pesquisa de campo: mais de 100 entrevistas foram realizadas em sete estados. O relatório descreve a surpresa, para olhos europeus, dos desenvolvimentos recentes do Brasil no campo da ciência e tecnologia. O primeiro estudo do Atlas apresentou o estado da Ciência e Tecnologia na China, Índia e Coréia do Sul. “As competências da China e da India são mais bem compreendidas do que as do Brasil” (que é uma surpresa), diz opress release da Demos que convida para o lançamento.
“O CGEE complementou, com o conhecimento profundo que tem do ambiente de ciência, tecnologia e inovação do Brasil, a experiência de networking internacional e a competência que a Demos desenvolveu durante a primeira fase do projeto Atlas das Idéias”, afirma Lucia Melo, presidente do CGEE. O CGEE desempenhou um papel fundamental no mapeamento da rota de entrevistas a ser seguida, identificando os atores principais e estabelecendo os contatos que proporcionaram a preparação de um extenso e realista documento sobre o cenário da CT&I no Brasil. “Estamos muito felizes com o resultado. A publicação é excelente e apresentará ao mundo uma face do Brasil importante e pouco conhecida”. Para Fernando Rizzo, Diretor do CGEE que supervisionou o estudo, um fator que considera muito positivo &eacu te; o olhar externo que a participação da Demos propiciou.
Durante o lançamento, em Londres, haverá um workshop sobre o Brasil, do qual participam o embaixador do Brasil na Grã Bretanha, Carlos Augusto Santos Neves; Andrew Kahn, executivo principal da UK Trade & Investment, além de dirigentes do CGEE. Também haverá uma apresentação do Prof. Luiz Horta sobre o Biocombustíveis no Brasil, assunto definido como de grande interesse durante o desenvolvimento do estudo. Em outubro, a tradução de Brazil: the Naturalkonwledge- economy será lançada em Brasília.
Forças do Brasil, de acordo com a Demos
O documento salienta como forças do Brasil a estabilidade política e econômica, o crescimento da produção cientifica e do numero de doutores e mestres, o apoio federal “bem organizado, tanto financeiro quanto regulatório” à ciência e tecnologia, uma base confiável em propriedade intelectual – em que a quebra de patentes de medicamentos para a AIDS é positivamente avaliada, a posição proeminente como exemplo na mitigação dos efeitos da mudança climática conferida pelo uso de biocombustiveis, uma cultura que valoriza a criatividade, e as multinacionais Petrobras, Vale, Gerdau e Embraer.
Fraquezas
As sete fraquezas apresentadas são: desigualdades social e geográfica; “baixa taxa de conversão da base de conhecimento em inovação”; o país ser voltado para si próprio; o peso dos impostos; o problema de como transformar em riqueza o potencial valor da liderança em biocombustiveis e no tema mudança climática; sistema educacional “abaixo de seu potencial”; e o descaso por reter e atrair recursos humanos altamente qualificados.
Aproveitar as qualidades brasileiras
O relatório oferece seis recomendações ao Brasil, todas no sentido de que o País tire maior proveito das qualidades que têm. A primeira delas é ampliar a discussão sobre temas que, de acordo com a consultoria inglesa, são inevitavelmente controversos – o exemplo é a tensão entre investir em ciência básica e investir na diminuição da desigualdade. A segunda afirma que o Brasil deve “contar uma nova história sobre a inovação” – o texto afirma que o País “precisa de confiança para escrever um novo capitulo” nessa história. “Aproveitar ao máximo a notoriedade global” trazida pelos biocombustiveis, e fazer disso uma oportunidade para “comunicar ao mundo sua força cientifica” é a terceira recomendação; organizar uma rede de apoio internacional a partir dos cientistas e empreendedores brasileiros vivendo no exterior e, finalmente, implementar com firmeza as políticas publicas já existentes completam as recomendações.
Para os estrangeiros, três recomendações
A consultoria inglesa avalia que a comunidade internacional se concentra muito na floresta amazônica e ignora a extensão e a diversidade da ciência e da inovação no Brasil; que o País tem potencial para cooperar e contribuir por ter desenvolvido novas formas de fazer ciência. Em particular para a Grã Bretanha, a consultoria sugere que consolide os resultados do recente “Ano da Ciência” encetado em colaboração. Para a Demos, “muitas áreas de inovação”, de seu país, “poderiam ser beneficiadas”.
Um sumário de Brazil, a knowledge natural- economy
O estudo, um caderno de 160 páginas, estrutura-se em uma Introdução e sete capítulos: Mapeamento, Pessoas, Lugares, Empresas, Cultura, Colaboração, Prognóstico. Há também um anexo com a lista de instituições visitadas.
Introdução
Kirsten Bound, a pesquisadora de campo principal e autora do relatório, chama a atenção inicialmente para o desconhecimento internacional sobre as atividades brasileiras em ciência e tecnologia – de Santos Dumont à produção científica, do avião Ipanema, da Embraer, movido a etanol, à força do sistema de pós-graduação; e propõe a definição da economia brasileira como baseada no conhecimento sobre os recursos naturais. “O sistema de inovação do País é em grande parte construído sobre seus recursos naturais e ambientais”, propõe a pesquisadora, para manifestar que o caminho brasileiro contesta a visão segundo a qual as economias baseadas no conhecimento ou em recursos naturais situam-se como dois extremos no espectro do desenvolvimento econômico. &nb sp;“No Brasil, a competência crescente em ciência e tecnologia não está separada, ou em oposição, aos recursos naturais, e sim integralmente ligada a eles”, afirma a Introdução.
Mapeamento
O segundo capitulo, Mapping, apresenta a economia brasileira, delineia brevemente a história da ciência e tecnologia no País, descreve o sistema de inovação brasileiro, detacando as instituições federais, as leis de inovação e de incentivos fiscais, o Plano de Ação em Ciência e Tecnologia e a Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo. Ao falar do financiamento, apresenta os números do dispêndio em pesquisa e desenvolvimento em relação ao PIB e compara os investimentos federais aos estaduais. Também alinha os dados sobre publicações cientificas, produção das principais universidades e patentes. Finalmente, destaca áreas de pesquisa: biocombustíveis, pesquisa em biodiversidade, nanotecnologia e pesquisa em células tronco .
Pessoas
No capitulo seguinte, sobre recursos humanos, o relatório aponta a necessidade de aumentar a quantidade de cientistas trabalhando na indústria. Também sugere a necessidade de atrair os brasileiros altamente qualificados que estejam trabalhando no exterior, embora reconheça a importância da presença deles em grandes centros de pesquisa, como colaboradores para os cientistas no Brasil. Chama a atenção também para a necessidade de diminuição da desigualdade social.
Lugares
Desigualdade também é tema do capitulo quatro, Lugares (Places). Depois de apresentar dados gerais sobre diferenças regionais brasileiras, o relatório destaca hotspots: No Sudeste, São Paulo (definido com “um outro país”, onde, quando se trata de C&T, “não apenas gasta e produz mais, como gasta e produz exponencialmente mais”); Rio de Janeiro (“conhecido pelas praias e pelo fio dental, mas também um dos mais fortes centros de ciência e tecnologia do País”); Minas Gerais (em que o destaque é a cidade de Santa Rita do Sapucaí); no Sul, Curitiba e Florianópolis; no Nordeste, o estado de Pernambuco; no Norte, a cidade de Manaus. Também Brasília recebeu menção especial no relatório.
Empresas
Três empresas são destacads no estudo: Petrobras, Embrapa e Natura; Vale, Gerdau e Embraco, são também mencionadas como “heróis feitos em casa”. O texto lamenta que sejam poucas as empresas que inovam; e apresenta três “fatores históricos” que explicariam a ‘performance de inovação desapontadora’: o fato de a estrutura da economia ser dominada por pequenas empresas familiares; a política de substituição de importações dos anos 60-70-80; as conseqüências do período de instabilidade econômica e política. Estabelecido o diagnóstico, o texto avalia como positivas as políticas e estratégias do governo; observa que há incertezas no quadro regulatório e na implementação. Finalmente, em resposta a uma questão sobre as perspectivas p ara o aparecimento de mais empresas inovadoras de grande porte, o relatório chama a atenção, positivamente, para incubadoras, para o aumento da disponibilidade do capital de risco; do lado negativo, para a dificuldade para a abertura de firmas e a falta de uma cultura de empreendedorismo.
Cultura
O capitulo sobre cultura traça um quadro contraditório do ideário dos brasileiros no Brasil. Com base, principalmente, em dados da organização norte americana Pew Research, a Demos descreve o País como conservador e despreconceituoso; preocupado com a preservação do meio ambiente; mais partidário do que contrário à globalização; de opinião favorável à ciência. A diversidade étnica e cultural da população é destacada no relatório como fonte de criatividade – vantajosa para a criação de inovações. O relatório também menciona como positivas algumas iniciativas de inclusão social. No parágrafo final, a consultoria avalia que a cultura brasileira, sua diversidade e criatividade, combinada com a singularidade de ter desenvolvido um sistema de inovação baseado em seus recursos naturais, pode fazer do País um lugar em que “a vasta maioria da população veja a si própria como contribuindo para um futuro mais inovador, próspero e sustentável”.
Colaboração
As dificuldades para a pesquisa conjunta internacional em biodiversidade, resultado da inexistência de legislação clara para o acesso aos recursos genéticos e biológicos, abrem o capitulo sobre Colaboração. No entanto, o relatório reconhece que a colaboração internacional cresce a uma taxa “saudável” ainda que, de acordo com os dados apresentados, venha existindo uma redução leve no numero de artigos publicados resultantes de cooperação entre cientistas brasileiros e estrangeiros. Com base em dados da National Science Foundation, a agência de financiamento à pesquisa dos EUA, o relatório afirma que a colaboração dos cientistas brasileiros é maior com os norte americanos, embora ligeiramente menor do que a mantida com os países da União Européia tomados em conjunto. O relatório detalha as relações de cooperação entre o Brasil e os EUA, França, Alemanha, Japão; Reino Unido e União Européia. Também informa sobre a cooperação sul-sul, classificada como “uma nova onda surgindo no Brasil”; e salienta as parcerias com países africanos e com a China, em assuntos como pesquisa em agricultura e doenças infecciosas. Adicionalmente, o texto diferencia a posição do Brasil em relação àquela da Índia e da China – enquanto os dois últimos são retratados como uma ‘ameaça’, o Brasil é visto como “uma potencia mais ocidental”.
Conclusão
A autora menciona, para finalizar, dois versos do Hino Nacional que a seu ver retratam dualidade que marca a trajetória de nosso país: o primeiro, que constata ser o Brasil“gigante pela própria natureza”; e o segundo , “O teu futuro espelha essa grandeza”, que só o tempo poderá confirmar.
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Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos
SCN Quadra 2, Bloco A, Ed. Corporate Financial Center, 11º andar, Sala 1102.
CEP 70712-900. Brasília, DF. Tel.: (61) 3424 9600, Fax (61) 3424 9659.
Ireland and the EU – A Fierce Fight (The Economist)
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Ireland and the EU
A fierce fight
From Economist.com
Looking back on the Lisbon-treaty battle
THE flight from London to Dublin—where I’m headed to cover the vote on the Lisbon treaty, a controversial EU reform plan (see article)—only lasts an hour, but it feels much further. By virtue of its constitution, Ireland is the only one of the 27 EU member-states putting the treaty to a popular vote. As a result, this island of 4m is attracting lots of international attention. I stifle a giggle as I spot another journalist preparing to board the same flight: he is wearing a bush outfit, as if he’s going to cover a war. All those pockets in the khaki vest do look handy, though.
I last visited Ireland 20 years ago, and was prepared to see a radically different place. I’d read all the stories about the Celtic Tiger, a country transformed in the past decade, and wondered if the charm had disappeared too. Between 1997 and 2007, the country had the fastest growing population and one of the strongest economies in Europe—for which EU aid received much credit.
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My seatmate on the flight, Kitty Donnelly, told the sort of story I would hear often during the week. An octogenarian with sparkling blue eyes, Kitty left her home in County Offaly after the second world war to work in a London bank. When she left, her village had no paved roads, few cars, and people were desperate for work.
After she retired in London some years ago, Kitty bought a house back in the village and returns twice a year to spend time with her nieces and nephews. “Everyone’s in a hurry now,” she said. “No one has time to talk. That’s what money does.” People have nice houses, cars and paved roads, she admitted, but the pubs are closing and the village feels like it is losing its soul. “You think you can go back but you can’t really. It’s never the same.”
Campaign posters line the road into Dublin. Some light-posts along the road have multiple signs. “Lisbon, it’ll cost you,” warns one. “Europe, let’s be at the heart of it,” says another.
After settling into my hotel , I jump in a taxi and head across the city (remarkably compact, by London standards) to attend a press conference held by the leaders of Ireland’s three main political parties. They got a wake-up call a few days earlier with a leading poll showing opponents to the Lisbon treaty (which they all support) gaining significant ground. There is a sizeable foreign press contingent present, but I don’t see the bushman.
Reporters are keen to ask the new taoiseach (as the prime minister is known) about comments by the French foreign minister, who warned that if Ireland voted no on the treaty “the first victim would be the Irish.” He evades nicely. A couple of Irish journalists standing next to me are muttering about the French. They race off to file their stories as the press conference breaks up. The broadcast folks are lined up ready to smile as the cameras turn on, and I go in search of real people.
Walking north across the river to O’Connell Street, I turn off into some of the side streets. The remainder of my afternoon is spent accosting Dubliners in a variety of locations: the old flower and produce market (almost hit by a forklift at one point), in little shops, and on the street.
One of the more interesting characters I meet is Eamonn Murphy, who owns Mary Mediatrix of All Graces, a Catholic bookshop. His shop window is covered with anti-treaty posters. Gregorian chants waft out the door. When I identify myself as a journalist, he thrusts a brochure into my hand: “9 reasons why a conscientious Catholic citizen should reject the Treaty of Lisbon.
The walls of Mr Murphy’s shop are plastered with the photos of babies he says were saved from abortion. I note that a senior Irish bishop has said the Lisbon treaty does not threaten Ireland’s anti-abortion stance. “Even a bishop is not infallible”, he responds sharply, “only the Pope is.”
He bends my ear for another 20 minutes. When he starts railing against the French and Dutch governments for “stealing” the right of their citizens to vote, which he calls “a mortal sin,” I know it’s time to leave.
PRESS credentials are issued at the Old Customs House, a grand building along the river housing several government departments. I’ve missed the official deadline for credentials and all the places in Dublin Castle’s main hall, where the results will be announced, are gone. Fortunately, a press officer thinks he can find a solution. I cool my heels for about 20 minutes before he appears with an official badge. My name is misspelled. He tells me not to worry.
Along O’Connell Street, I encounter a media pack surrounding none other than Gerry Adams (pictured), along with other Sinn Fein leaders. They oppose the Lisbon treaty. Some nasty yelling about the IRA breaks out among the crowd (one man said they shot his mate), turning this into a tense encounter.
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| Back in the news |
By this point I’m almost stumbling over campaigners. Much of the “no” camp is down the street. One group (from Berlin, it turns out) has propped up life-sized cut-outs of EU leaders (Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel among them) plugging their ears. Too bad their organisation, I learn upon close questioning, has virtually no support in Ireland.
A man from the Socialist Party stands on a chair nearby, yelling into a bullhorn. “So I’ve been asked yet again, what is the Lisbon treaty about,” he shouted. “It is a constitution for Europe.” A few tattooed youths standing nearby tell me they “don’t want Europe to go the way of the USA, full of poverty, where big corporations control everything.”
After this rather eclectic bunch, Declan Ganley is a change of pace. A rich businessman from Galway who founded something called the Libertas Institute, he has shot to prominence in recent weeks as one of the more articulate campaigners against the Lisbon treaty. We meet in a posh hotel lobby south of the river. When I arrive, I find another British journalist in conversation with Mr Ganley’s sister, who is wearing a Libertas shirt. Hearing that I am American, she tells me that she and her husband are almost more excited about the American presidential campaign than they are about the Irish vote.
The polished Mr Ganley wears pinstripes, a powder-blue shirt and tie, and fleur-de-lis cufflinks; thanks to a London childhood, he has a British accent. Facing repeated questions who finances the Libertas campaign, he smiles and says his group will play by the same disclosure rules that the other parties do. Libertas says they’re spending about €1.3m on the campaign; leading political figures suspect the figure is higher. They have purchased big ads on the side of Dublin buses, and have sponsored many of the more colourful anti-treaty posters plastered all over the streets.
Mr Ganley’s reasons for opposing the Lisbon treaty range from its creation of a non-elected president and foreign minister, to what he considers the enshrinement of so-called “national champions” in industry. This, he says, will stifle precisely the sort of competition that Europe needs to encourage. Critics say he sounds like just another British Eurosceptic.
Mr Ganley’s business dealings seem to have provoked particular curiosity. His company, Rivada, supplies communications technology to the American National Guard. He won an award after Hurricane Katrina for supplying the Guard, and when I mention this he thanks me. “That’s not something you’d ever see mentioned in the Irish press,” he says. “They think the term ‘military’ is toxic.”
He has worked in some less democratic places in eastern Europe, too, but professes a real fondness for America. Unprompted, he says that his heroes include Burke, Jefferson, Franklin and Washington. He quotes Jefferson: “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” I ask if he has political ambitions of his own. He laughs and shrugs off the question, but seems flattered by it, and not very subtly returns to it several times in the interview.
After a coffee with a few other journalists to trade some political gossip, I head back to my hotel to check email and have a bite to eat. My hotel is not terribly expensive, but the prices on its (Asian) menu are eye-popping. A couple of starters and a half-bottle of wine run me almost €40.
Four men in suits at the next table (two Australians, an Englishman and an Irishman) are clearly dining on an expense account. The courses keep coming; the wine and conversation flow. As I get up to leave, the Irishman tells another joke about a farmer who figured out how to game the EU’s aid system.
THANKS largely to EU membership, the Celtic Tiger roared for years. Farmers received generous subsidies. European aid helped build roads, bridges and schools. Immigrants from eastern Europe provided cheap labour. Ireland drew massive foreign investment, and the housing market became one of Europe’s fastest growing in the mid 1990s.
But recently the tiger has been limping. Inflation and unemployment are rising as consumer spending falls. The housing market is stagnant. Foreign investment hasn’t disappeared entirely, but neither is it creating as many jobs as it once did. Some Irish people grumble that immigrants (who comprise about 15% of the population, a proportion that has doubled in the last 10 years) have added to their economic problems.
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| City of many colours |
Alan Ahearne, an economist in Galway with whom I’m speaking this morning, thinks the housing-market downturn is the biggest worry. Residential building accounted for an usually large portion of GDP (17% in 2006, versus an average of 6% in the euro area and America). In other words, he says, “we were three times more dependent on home-building than the US was.” The only country that came close to Ireland’s dependence on construction was Spain, which is also suffering today.
As prices rose in Dublin, new properties went up farther away from the city, sometimes in remote villages up to 90 minutes away. “When I was a kid, we ran into the fields and played football for two hours,” Mr Ahearne recalls. “Now kids are spending more and more time sitting in the back seat of a car.”
Today many of the newer properties, especially in distant villages, lie vacant. A taxi driver tells me that this brother, also a driver, bought a home two hours’ drive from Dublin. Now that the market has dropped, “he’s stuck out there.” If he were to sell the house today, he would lose as much as €60,000.
I spend the rest of the day trying to gather more stories on housing and immigration. I spot a recruitment agency in an immigrant neighbourhood, and pop into the office of Cornel Sandu, a 40-year-old Romanian who arrived in Ireland a decade ago. He now owns and manages an agency that places workers in the construction and catering sectors. “In the construction sector, they’re all moaning,” he confirmed. The demand for temporary workers has dropped off 35% from last year. “This is a survival year,” he says.
But Mr Sandu, looking prosperous enough in a blazer and expensive watch, says the shake-out may ultimately be good for business. The “cowboys” who used to operate in the recruitment market, “taking advantage of people”, have vanished. “Only the strongest and fittest will survive.”
His firm, Condor, is trying to adapt by shifting its focus from residential construction to civil work (on motorways and infrastructure projects funded by the government). As the market has dropped, he says, many unskilled workers from abroad have left Ireland. “But you can always place a good qualified surveyor with six or seven years’ experience.”
By early evening, I find myself in a small convenience store run by a Moldovan named Ivan Ivanov. His shop is just across the road from an apartment block housing many immigrant workers. He stocks his shop accordingly: Polish sausage, Romanian chocolate and newspapers in multiple eastern-European languages (all printed in Ireland).
When I tell Mr Ivanov that I want to speak with immigrant workers, especially in the construction industry, he becomes a booking agent. Every time a customer enters, he tells me where they’re from, where they work and how well they speak English. Sometimes, he gets a little too eager. “There are two girls over there from Slovakia,” he says, interrupting my fruitful conversation with an attractive young Pole named Nikolaj Szczeszek.
Mr Szczeszek arrived a couple of years ago. He speaks excellent English, and does paving work for a building company. His company has shrunk from 200 workers (mostly Poles) to 25. “The boss sent them on holiday, but with no pay,” he says drily. Many have returned to Poland, where they had families waiting.
Paul Prokopiak, a 28-year-old structural engineer from Warsaw, tells a similar story. “Most Poles are going back home,” he says. An agency contacted him recently, promising a job in Warsaw. He wants to stay in Dublin. His girlfriend is studying English. But eventually the booming Polish job-market may prove too tempting.
REFERENDUM day has finally arrived in Ireland. The front page of my morning paper shows a spiky-haired sword-swallower who calls himself the Space Cowboy pushing 27 blades down his throat (pictured). Each one has the flag of a European country attached to the handle. As I watched him do his act on Grafton Street yesterday afternoon, a middle-aged woman standing next to me asked “Is he voting yes or no?” (I regretfully inform her he’s Australian).
This morning I’m meeting a lawyer to discuss the treaty. Having read the text (which runs to a few hundred pages), I understand why many Irish voters are confused. Even a few politicians have admitted to not reading the document, and the lawyer admits, after an hour of heavy parsing, that a law degree would be useful to wade through it all. He also said that some of the debate’s most emotional subtopics, like abortion, are red herrings—they are simply not at issue in the Lisbon treaty.
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| European stunt |
I plan to visit several polling places in the city centre and suburbs over the next several hours, speaking with at least 30 voters at each station. My first stop, in a slightly grubby area of central Dublin, turns up many “no” voters (25 of 32 people polled). They include an unemployed plumbing installer with tobacco-stained teeth who tells me there are few jobs available and he is competing with immigrants for the few openings that exist.
“If you don’t know, vote no,” says a young truck driver who says he does not understand what the vote is about. A Catholic nun says she is opposed to the treaty on moral grounds. “I’m not voting as a nun,” she adds. “I’m voting as an individual.” One of the yes votes comes from a costume designer. She says Ireland has benefitted greatly from being closer to Europe, and Dublin has become a more lively place in recent years. She, too, seems rather vague about the details of the actual treaty.
As the day progresses, I move from Dublin’s working-class north side to its prosperous south, and finally to the comfortable suburbs. I meet more “yes” voters here. They include well-fed executives and well-coiffed housewives. “Europe is Ireland’s future,” says a businessman wearing a pinkie ring. By the afternoon, a distinction makes itself clear: working-class people are more likely to vote no than professionals, and the “no” voters are vehement. I suspect the treaty will be defeated.
Zipping back into the city centre in the early evening, I meet a couple of colleagues in front of the modern addition to the National Gallery. We walk a few blocks to a stylish wine bar, where a senior Irish journalist tells us he hears the treaty may be rejected. A colleague visiting from Brussels shares his views on the likely fallout there if the treaty is defeated.
Afterward, I walk back north across the river (the polls are open until 10pm). I spend a couple more hours talking with Dubliners. What I hear only reinforces my sense that the treaty is in trouble.
I meet a group of immigrant workers who seem far more interested in Poland’s match against Austria in the European football championships than in the treaty’s fate. A couple of them invite me to watch the match at a bar, and that’s where I end the evening: perched on a bar stool amid a crowd of twentysomething Poles, mostly men, who have come to Ireland seeking work. They wear red-and-white shirts and scarves, occasionally jeering the referee and erupting into chants of “Polska, Polska”. For a while, it is easy to forget that I am in Ireland.
DUBLIN Castle, the seat of British rule in Ireland until 1922, is the focus of international political and media attention today. The multi-room press centre is packed. At a long table running the length of the room about 30 people are working on their laptops. Others are sitting at round tables, sipping coffee and munching on chocolate biscuits, or standing in clusters by several big television screens scattered around the room. The RTE television network has live coverage from Dublin Castle and polling places around the country for much of the day. A list of all the counties in Ireland is distributed that allows us to follow the voting results and percentage breakdowns as they are announced.
By late morning it looks clear that Ireland will vote no. Final results are in from just a few counties, but the preliminaries tell a pretty consistent story. Most of the journalists are electrified: a no is newsier than a yes. Ireland is putting the brakes on Brussels. A few reporters from the bigger European states, including France, look dumbstruck.
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| The nays have it |
Around mid-day Declan Ganley, the anti-treaty campaigner from Libertas, calls this “a great day to be Irish.” All the journalists are on their phones and computers now, banging out reports and talking with editors. Every so often a group jumps up and runs out, notebooks and cameras in hand, when word circulates that one politician or another is making a statement in the courtyard.
In the early afternoon, a notice is passed around about a late-afternoon press conference scheduled in the government buildings off Merrion Square. Mr Ganley, not to be upstaged, announces a simultaneous press conference at a posh hotel across the same square: the government ministers are stony-faced, Mr Ganley jubilant.
I wander outside shortly after 3pm, riding on a caffeine and sugar high, and walk straight into a media scrum surrounding Gerry Adams. He and his colleagues want to claim their share of credit for the no vote too. After making some remarks in Irish, Mr Adams says in English, “It was David versus Goliath, and Goliath lost again.” The Irish press had previously written off Sinn Fein as on its deathbed; the vote has boosted their confidence.
Later I speak with Michael Marsh, a professor of political behaviour at Trinity College. The outcome, he says, is not surprising: the Irish “are not prepared to take their politicians’ word for anything, that’s been true for a long time.”
Mr Marsh tells me one of the broader political trends in Ireland is a weakening of ties to particular parties, and the strengthening of ties to particular candidates (especially those focused on local issues). He laments the lack of a proper debate between parties on substantive issues. In his view, Ireland’s political structure has “a weak centre and not much else…Decisions are made for short-term political advantage…It’s the hard decisions we haven’t been very good at taking for the last 10 years.”
When my work here is done, I climb into a taxi for a ride to the airport. The driver is chatty. Originally from Tipperary, he has lived in Dublin for more than 30 years. He wants to know if Ireland was wrong to defeat the treaty. He voted against it, but sounds concerned about the backlash that already appears to be building across Europe.
Then he points out the pub where Bertie Ahern, the recently departed taoiseach (now facing serious questions about his finances), usually drinks. “I don’t think Bertie did anything different than the rest of them,” the driver tells me. In the final leg of my journey, we shift topics to the way Ireland has changed in the past couple of decades. He echoes a sentiment I’ve heard from many people this week: “We hardly know it ourselves.”
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I will never forget my first visit, in 2003, to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. I was welcomed by Wang Luolin, the academy’s vice-president, whose grandfather had translated Marx’s Das Kapital into Chinese, and Huang Ping, a former Red Guard. Sitting in oversized armchairs, we sipped ceremonial tea and introduced ourselves. Wang Luolin nodded politely and smiled, then told me that his academy had 50 research centres covering 260 disciplines with 4,000 full-time researchers.
As he said this, I could feel myself shrink into the seams of my vast chair: Britain’s entire think tank community is numbered in the hundreds, Europe’s in the low thousands; even the think-tank heaven of the US cannot have more than 10,000. But here in China, a single institution—and there are another dozen or so think tanks in Beijing alone—had 4,000 researchers. Admittedly, the people at CASS think that many of the researchers are not up to scratch, but the raw figures were enough.
At the beginning of that trip, I had hoped to get a quick introduction to China, learn the basics and go home. I had imagined that China’s intellectual life consisted of a few unbending ideologues in the back rooms of the Communist party or the country’s top universities. Instead, I stumbled on a hidden world of intellectuals, think-tankers and activists, all engaged in intense debate about the future of their country. I soon realised that it would take more than a few visits to Beijing and Shanghai to grasp the scale and ambition of China’s internal debates. Even on that first trip my mind was made up—I wanted to devote the next few years of my life to understanding the living history that was unfolding before me. Over a three-year period, I have spoken with dozens of Chinese thinkers, watching their views develop in line with the breathtaking changes in their country. Some were party members; others were outside the party and suffering from a more awkward relationship with the authorities. Yet to some degree, they are all insiders. They have chosen to live and work in mainland China, and thus to cope with the often capricious demands of the one-party state.
We are used to China’s growing influence on the world economy—but could it also reshape our ideas about politics and power? This story of China’s intellectual awakening is less well documented. We closely follow the twists and turns in America’s intellectual life, but how many of us can name a contemporary Chinese writer or thinker? Inside China—in party forums, but also in universities, in semi-independent think tanks, in journals and on the internet—debate rages about the direction of the country: “new left” economists argue with the “new right” about inequality; political theorists argue about the relative importance of elections and the rule of law; and in the foreign policy realm, China’s neocons argue with liberal internationalists about grand strategy. Chinese thinkers are trying to reconcile competing goals, exploring how they can enjoy the benefits of global markets while protecting China from the creative destruction they could unleash in its political and economic system. Some others are trying to challenge the flat world of US globalisation with a “walled world” Chinese version.
Paradoxically, the power of the Chinese intellectual is amplified by China’s repressive political system, where there are no opposition parties, no independent trade unions, no public disagreements between politicians and a media that exists to underpin social control rather than promote political accountability. Intellectual debate in this world can become a surrogate for politics—if only because it is more personal, aggressive and emotive than anything that formal politics can muster. While it is true there is no free discussion about ending the Communist party’s rule, independence for Tibet or the events of Tiananmen Square, there is a relatively open debate in leading newspapers and academic journals about China’s economic model, how to clean up corruption or deal with foreign policy issues like Japan or North Korea. Although the internet is heavily policed, debate is freer here than in the printed word (although one of the most free-thinking bloggers, Hu Jia, was recently arrested). And behind closed doors, academics and thinkers will often talk freely about even the most sensitive topics, such as political reform. The Chinese like to argue about whether it is the intellectuals that influence decision-makers, or whether groups of decision-makers use pet intellectuals as informal mouthpieces to advance their own views. Either way, these debates have become part of the political process, and are used to put ideas in play and expand the options available to Chinese decision-makers. Intellectuals are, for example, regularly asked to brief the politburo in “study sessions”; they prepare reports that feed into the party’s five-year plans; and they advise on the government’s white papers.
So is the Chinese intelligentsia becoming increasingly open and western? Many of the concepts it argues over—including, of course, communism itself—are western imports. And a more independent-minded, western style of discourse may be emerging as a result of the 1m students who have studied outside China—many in the west—since 1978; fewer than half have returned, but that number is rising. However, one should not forget that the formation of an “intellectual” in China remains very different from in the west. Education is still focused on practical contributions to national life, and despite a big expansion of higher education (around 20 per cent of 18-30 year olds now enrol at university), teaching methods rely heavily on rote learning. Moreover, all of these people will be closely monitored for political dissent, with “political education” classes still compulsory.
Zhang Weiying has a thing about Cuban cigars. When I went to see him in his office in Beijing University, I saw half a dozen boxes of Cohiba piled high on his desk. The cigar boxes—worth several times a Chinese peasant’s annual income—are fragments of western freedom (albeit products of a communist nation), symbols of the dynamism he hopes will gradually eclipse and replace the last vestiges of Maoism. Like other economic liberals—or members of the “new right” as their opponents call them—he thinks China will not be free until the public sector is dismantled and the state has shrivelled into a residual body designed mainly to protect property rights.
The new right was at the heart of China’s economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Zhang Weiying has a favourite allegory to explain these reforms. He tells a story about a village that relied on horses to conduct its chores. Over time, the village elders realised that the neighbouring village, which relied on zebras, was doing better. So after years of hailing the virtues of the horse, they decided to embrace the zebra. The only obstacle was converting the villagers who had been brainwashed over decades into worshipping the horse. The elders developed an ingenious plan. Every night, while the villagers slept, they painted black stripes on the white horses. When the villagers awoke the leaders reassured them that the animals were not really zebras, just the same old horses adorned with a few harmless stripes. After a long interval the village leaders began to replace the painted horses with real zebras. These prodigious animals transformed the village’s fortunes, increasing productivity and creating wealth all around. Only many years later—long after all the horses had been replaced with zebras and the village had benefited from many years of prosperity—did the elders summon the citizenry to proclaim that their community was a village of zebras, and that zebras were good and horses bad.
Zhang Weiying’s story is one way of understanding his theory of “dual-track pricing,” first put forward in 1984. He argued that “dual-track pricing” would allow the government to move from an economy where prices were set by officials to one where they were set by the market, without having to publicly abandon its commitment to socialism or run into the opposition of all those with a vested interest in central planning. Under this approach, some goods and services continued to be sold at state-controlled prices while others were sold at market prices. Over time, the proportion of goods sold at market prices was steadily increased until by the early 1990s, almost all products were sold at market prices. The “dual-track” approach embodies the combination of pragmatism and incrementalism that has allowed China’s reformers to work around obstacles rather than confront them.
The most famous village of zebras was Shenzhen. At the end of the 1970s, Shenzhen was an unremarkable fishing village, providing a meagre living for its few thousand inhabitants. But over the next three decades, it became an emblem of the Chinese capitalism that Zhang Weiying and his colleagues were building. Because of its proximity to Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping chose Shenzhen in 1979 as the first “special economic zone,” offering its leaders tax breaks, freedom from regulation and a licence to pioneer new market ideas. The architects of reform in Shenzhen wanted to build high-tech plants that could mass-produce value-added goods for sale in the west. Such experimental zones were financed by drawing on the country’s huge savings and the revenues from exports. The coastal regions sucked in a vast number of workers from the countryside, which held down urban wages. And the whole system was laissez-faire—allowing wealth to trickle down from the rich to the poor organically rather than consciously redistributing it. Deng Xiaoping pointedly declared that “some must get rich first,” arguing that the different regions should “eat in separate kitchens” rather than putting their resources into a “common pot.” As a result, the reformers of the eastern provinces were allowed to cut free from the impoverished inland areas and steam ahead.
But life today is getting tougher for the economists behind this system, like Zhang Weiying. After 30 years of having the best of the argument with ideas imported from the west, China has turned against the new right. Opinion polls show that they are the least popular group in China. Public disquiet is growing over the costs of reform, with protests by laid-off workers and concern over illegal demolitions and unpaid wages. And the ideas of the market are being challenged by a new left, which advocates a gentler form of capitalism. A battle of ideas pits the state against market; coasts against inland provinces; towns against countryside; rich against poor.
Wang Hui is one of the leaders of the new left, a loose grouping of intellectuals who are increasingly capturing the public mood and setting the tone for political debate through their articles in journals such as Dushu. Wang Hui was a student of literature rather than politics, but he was politicised through his role in the student demonstrations of 1989 that congregated on Tiananmen Square. Like most young intellectuals at the time, he was a strong believer in the potential of the market. But after the Tiananmen massacre, Wang Hui took off to the mountains and spent two years in hiding, getting to know peasants and workers. His experiences there made him doubt the justice of unregulated free markets, and convinced him that the state must play a role in preventing inequality. Wang Hui’s ideas were developed further during his exile in the US in the 1990s, but like many other new left thinkers he has returned to mainland China—in his case to teach at the prestigious Qinghua University. I met him last year in “Thinker’s Café” in Beijing, a bright and airy retreat with comfy sofas and fresh espressos. He looks like an archetypal public intellectual: cropped hair, a brown jacket and black polo-neck sweater. But Wang Hui does not live in an ivory tower. He writes reports exposing local corruption and helps workers organise themselves against illegal privatisations. His grouping is “new” because, unlike the “old left,” it supports market reforms. It is left because, unlike the “new right,” it worries about inequality: “China is caught between the two extremes of misguided socialism and crony capitalism, and suffering from the worst elements of both… I am in favour of orienting the country toward market reforms, but China’s development must be more balanced. We must not give total priority to GDP growth to the exclusion of workers’ rights and the environment.”
The new left’s philosophy is a product of China’s relative affluence. Now that the market is driving economic growth, they ask what should be done with the wealth. Should it continue accumulating in the hands of an elite, or can China foster a model of development that benefits all citizens? They want to develop a Chinese variant of social democracy. As Wang Hui says: “We cannot count on a state on the German or Nordic model. We have such a large country that the state would have to be vast to provide that kind of welfare. That is why we need institutional innovation. Wang Shaoguang [a political economist] is talking about low-price healthcare. Cui Zhiyuan [a political theorist] is talking about reforming property rights to give workers a say over the companies where they work. Hu Angang [an economist] is talking about green development.”
The balance of power in Beijing is subtly shifting towards the left. At the end of 2005, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao published the “11th five-year plan,” their blueprint for a “harmonious society.” For the first time since the reform era began in 1978, economic growth was not described as the overriding goal for the Chinese state. They talked instead about introducing a welfare state with promises of a 20 per cent year-on-year increase in the funds available for pensions, unemployment benefit, health insurance and maternity leave. For rural China, they promised an end to arbitrary taxes and improved health and education. They also pledged to reduce energy consumption by 20 per cent.
The 11th five-year plan is a template for a new Chinese model. From the new right, it keeps the idea of permanent experimentation—a gradualist reform process rather than shock therapy. And it accepts that the market will drive economic growth. From the new left, it draws a concern about inequality and the environment and a quest for new institutions that can marry co-operation with competition.
In February 2007, Hu Jintao proudly announced the creation of a new special economic zone complete with the usual combination of export subsidies, tax breaks and investments in roads, railways and shipping. However, this special economic zone was in the heart of Africa—in the copper-mining belt of Zambia. China is transplanting its growth model into the African continent by building a series of industrial hubs linked by rail, road and shipping lanes to the rest of the world. Zambia will be home to China’s “metals hub,” providing the People’s Republic with copper, cobalt, diamonds, tin and uranium. The second zone will be in Mauritius, providing China with a “trading hub” that will give 40 Chinese businesses preferential access to the 20-member state common market of east and southern Africa stretching from Libya to Zimbabwe, as well as access to the Indian ocean and south Asian markets. The third zone—a “shipping hub”—will probably be in the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam. Nigeria, Liberia and the Cape Verde islands are competing for two other slots. In the same way that eastern Europe was changed by a competition to join the EU, we could see Africa transformed by the competition to attract Chinese investment.
As it creates these zones, Beijing is embarking on a building spree, criss-crossing the African continent with new roads and railways—investing far more than the old colonial powers ever did. Moreover, China’s presence is changing the rules of economic development. The IMF and the World Bank used to drive the fear of God into government officials and elected leaders, but today they struggle to be listened to even by the poorest countries of Africa. The IMF spent years negotiating a transparency agreement with the Angolan government only to be told hours before the deal was due to be signed, in March 2004, that the authorities in Luanda were no longer interested in the money: they had secured a $2bn soft loan from China. This tale has been repeated across the continent—from Chad to Nigeria, Sudan to Algeria, Ethiopia and Uganda to Zimbabwe.
But the spread of the Chinese model goes far beyond the regions that have been targeted by Chinese investors. Research teams from middle-income and poor countries from Iran to Egypt, Angola to Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela have been crawling around the Chinese cities and countryside in search of lessons from Beijing’s experience. Intellectuals such as Zhang Weiying and Hu Angang have been asked to provide training for them. Scores of countries are copying Beijing’s state-driven development using public money and foreign investment to build capital-intensive industries. A rash of copycat special economic zones have been set up all over the world—the World Bank estimates that over 3,000 projects are taking place in 120 countries. Globalisation was supposed to mean the worldwide triumph of the market economy, but China is showing that state capitalism is one of its biggest beneficiaries.
As free market ideas have spread across the world, liberal democracy has often travelled in its wake. But for the authorities in Beijing there is nothing inexorable about liberal democracy. One of the most surprising features of Chinese intellectual life is the way that “democracy” intellectuals who demanded elections in the 1980s and 1990s have changed their positions on political reform.
Yu Keping is like the Zhang Weiying of political reform. He is a rising star and an informal adviser to President Hu Jintao. He runs an institute that is part university, part think tank, part management consultancy for government reform. When he talks about the country’s political future, he often draws a direct analogy with the economic realm. When I last met him in Beijing, he told me that overnight political reform would be as damaging to China as economic “shock therapy.” Instead, he has promoted the idea of democracy gradually working its way up from successful grassroots experiments. He hopes that by promoting democracy first within the Communist party, it will then spread to the rest of society. Just as the coastal regions were allowed to “get rich first,” Yu Keping thinks that party members should “get democracy first” by having internal party elections.
Where the coastal regions benefited from natural economic advantages such as proximity to Hong Kong, the Cantonese language and transport links, Yu Keping sees advantages for party members—such as their high levels of education and articulacy—which make them into a natural democratic vanguard. What is more, he can point to examples of this happening. At his suggestion, in 2006 I visited a county in Sichuan province called Pinchang that has allowed party members to vote for the bosses of township parties. In the long run, democracy could be extended to the upper echelons of the party, including competitive elections for the most senior posts. The logical conclusion of his ideas on inner party democracy would be for the Communist party to split into different factions that competed on ideological slates for support. It is possible to imagine informal new left and new right groupings one day even becoming formal parties within the party. If the Communist party were a country, its 70m members would make it bigger than Britain. And yet it is hard to imagine the remote, impoverished county of Pinchang becoming a model for the gleaming metropolises of Shanghai, Beijing or Shenzhen. So far, none of the other 2,860 counties of China has followed its lead.
Many intellectuals in China are starting to question the utility of elections. Pan Wei, a rising star at Beijing University, castigated me at our first meeting for paying too much attention to the experiments in grassroots democracy. “The Sichuan experiment will go nowhere,” he said. “The local leaders have their personal political goal: they want to make their names known. But the experiment has not succeeded. In fact, Sichuan is the place with the highest number of mass protests. Very few other places want to emulate it.”
Chinese thinkers argue that all developed democracies are facing a political crisis: turnout in elections is falling, faith in political leaders has declined, parties are losing members and populism is on the rise. They study the ways that western leaders are going over the heads of political parties and pioneering new techniques to reach the people such as referendums, opinion surveys or “citizens’ juries.” The west still has multi-party elections as a central part of the political process, but has supplemented them with new types of deliberation. China, according to the new political thinkers, will do things the other way around: using elections in the margins but making public consultations, expert meetings and surveys a central part of decision-making. This idea was described pithily by Fang Ning, a political scientist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He compared democracy in the west to a fixed-menu restaurant where customers can select the identity of their chef, but have no say in what dishes he chooses to cook for them. Chinese democracy, on the other hand, always involves the same chef—the Communist party—but the policy dishes which are served up can be chosen “à la carte.”
Chongqing is a municipality of 30m that few people in the west have heard of. It nestles in the hills at the confluence of the Yangtze and Jialin Jiang rivers and it is trying to become a living laboratory for the ideas of intellectuals like Pan Wei and Fang Ning. The city’s government has made all significant rulings subject to public hearings—in person, on television and on the internet. The authorities are proudest of the hearings on ticket prices for the light railway, which saw fares reduced from 15 to just 2 yuan (about 14p). This experiment is being emulated in other cities around China. But an even more interesting experiment was carried out in the small township of Zeguo in Wenling City—it used a novel technique of “deliberative polling” to decide on major spending decisions. The brainchild of a Stanford political scientist called James Fishkin, it harks back to an Athenian ideal of democracy (see “The thinking voter,” Prospect May 2004). It involves randomly selecting a sample of the population and involving them in a consultation process with experts, before asking them to vote on issues. Zeguo used this technique to decide how to spend its 40m yuan (£2.87m) public works budget. So far the experiment has been a one-off but Fishkin and the Chinese political scientist He Baogang believe that “deliberative democracy” could be a template for political reform.
The authorities certainly seem willing to experiment with all kinds of political innovations. In Zeguo, they have even introduced a form of government by focus group. But the main criterion guiding political reform seems to be that it must not threaten the Communist party’s monopoly on power. Can a more responsive form of authoritarianism evolve into a legitimate and stable form of government?
In the long term, China’s one-party state may well collapse. However, in the medium term, the regime seems to be developing increasingly sophisticated techniques to prolong its survival and pre-empt discontent. China has already changed the terms of the debate about globalisation by proving that authoritarian regimes can deliver economic growth. In the future, its model of deliberative dictatorship could prove that one-party states can deliver a degree of popular legitimacy as well. And if China’s experiments with public consultation work, dictatorships around the world will take heart from a model that allows one-party states to survive in an era of globalisation and mass communications.
China scholars in the west argue over whether the country is actively promoting autocracy, or whether it is just single-mindedly pursuing its national interest. Either way, China has emerged as the biggest global champion of authoritarianism. The pressure group Human Rights Watch complains that “China’s growing foreign aid programme creates new options for dictators who were previously dependent on those who insisted on human rights progress.”
China’s foray into international politics should not, however, be reduced to its support for African dictators. It is trying to redefine the meaning of power on the world stage. Indeed, measuring “CNP”—comprehensive national power—has become a national hobby-horse. Each of the major foreign policy think tanks has devised its own index to give a numerical value to every nation’s power—economic, political, military and cultural. And in this era of globalisation and universal norms, the most striking thing about Chinese strategists is their unashamed focus on “national” power. The idea of recapturing sovereignty from global economic forces, companies and even individuals is central to the Chinese worldview.
Yang Yi is a military man, a rear admiral in the navy and the head of China’s leading military think tank. He is one of the tough guys of the Chinese foreign policy establishment, but his ideas on power go far beyond assessments of the latest weapons systems. He argues that the US has created a “strategic siege” around China by assuming the “moral height” in international relations. Every time the People’s Republic tries to assert itself in diplomatic terms, to modernise its military or to open relationships with other countries, the US presents it as a threat. And the rest of the world, Yang Yi complains, all too often takes its lead from the hyperpower: “The US has the final say on the making and revising of the international rules of the game. They have dominated international discourse… the US says, ‘Only we can do this; you can’t do this.’”
One of the buzzwords in Chinese foreign policy circles is ruan quanli—the Chinese term for “soft power.” This idea was invented by the American political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990, but it is being promoted with far more zeal in Beijing than in Washington DC. In April 2006, a conference was organised in Beijing to launch the “China dream”—China’s answer to the American dream. It was an attempt to associate the People’s Republic with three powerful ideas: economic development, political sovereignty and international law. Whereas American diplomats talk about regime change, their Chinese counterparts talk about respect for sovereignty and the diversity of civilisations. Whereas US foreign policy uses sanctions and isolation to back up its political objectives, the Chinese offer aid and trade with no strings. Whereas America imposes its preferences on reluctant allies, China makes a virtue of at least appearing to listen to other countries.
But while all Chinese thinkers want to strengthen national power, they disagree on their country’s long-term goals. On the one hand, liberal internationalists like Zheng Bijian like to talk about China’s “peaceful rise” and how it has rejoined the world; adapting to global norms and learning to make a positive contribution to global order. In recent years, Beijing has been working through the six-party talks to solve the North Korean nuclear problem; working with the EU, Russia and the US on Iran; adopting a conciliatory position on climate change at an international conference in Montreal in 2005; and sending 4,000 peacekeepers to take part in UN missions. Even on issues where China is at odds with the west—such as humanitarian intervention—the Chinese position is becoming more nuanced. When the west intervened over Kosovo, China opposed it on the grounds that it contravened the “principle of non-intervention.” On Iraq, it abstained. And on Darfur, in 2006 it finally voted for a UN mandate for peacekeepers—although Beijing is still under fire for its close ties to the Sudanese government.
On the other hand, China’s “neocons”—or perhaps they should be called “neo-comms”—like Yang Yi and his colleague Yan Xuetong openly argue that they are using modern thinking to help China realise ancient dreams. Their long-term goal is to see China return to great-power status. Like many Chinese scholars, Yan Xuetong has been studying ancient thought. “Recently I read all these books by ancient Chinese scholars and discovered that these guys are smart—their ideas are much more relevant than most modern international relations theory,” he said. The thing that interested him the most was the distinction that ancient Chinese scholars made between two kinds of order: the “Wang” (which literally means “king”) and the “Ba” (“overlord”). The “Wang” system was centred on a dominant superpower, but its primacy was based on benign government rather than coercion or territorial expansion. The “Ba” system, on the other hand, was a classic hegemonic system, where the most powerful nation imposed order on its periphery. Yan explains how in ancient times the Chinese operated both systems: “Within Chinese Asia we had a ‘Wang’ system. Outside, when dealing with ‘barbarians,’ we had a hegemonic system. That is just like the US today, which adopts a ‘Wang’ system inside the western club, where it doesn’t use military force or employ double standards. On a global scale, however, the US is hegemonic, using military power and employing double standards.” According to Yan Xuetong, China will have two options as it becomes more powerful. “It could become part of the western ‘Wang’ system. But this will mean changing its political system to become a democracy. The other option is for China to build its own system.”
The tension between the liberal internationalists and the neo-comms is a modern variant of the Mao-era split between bourgeois and revolutionary foreign policy. For the next few years, China will be decidedly bourgeois. It has decided—with some reservations—to join the global economy and its institutions. Its goal is to strengthen them in order to pin down the US and secure a peaceful environment for China’s development. But in the long term, some Chinese hope to build a global order in China’s image. The idea is to avoid confrontation while changing the facts on the ground. Just as they are doing in domestic policy, they hope to build pockets of an alternative reality—as in Africa—where it is Chinese values and norms that increasingly determine the course of events rather than western ones.
The western creations of the EU and Nato—defined by the pooling rather than the protecting of sovereignty—may one day find their matches in the embryonic East Asian Community and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. Through these organisations, China is reassuring its neighbours of its peaceful intent and creating a new community of interest that excludes the US. The former US official Susan Shirk draws a parallel between China’s multilateral diplomacy and her own country’s after the second world war: “By binding itself to international rules and regimes, the US successfully established a hegemonic order.”
The UN is also becoming an amplifier of the Chinese worldview. Unlike Russia, which comports itself with a swagger—enjoying its ability to overtly frustrate US and EU plans—China tends to opt for a conciliatory posture. In the run-up to the Iraq war, although China opposed military action, it allowed France, Germany and Russia to lead the opposition to it. In 2005 when there was a debate about enlarging the UN security council, China encouraged African countries to demand their own seat, which effectively killed off Japan’s bid for a permanent seat. Equally, Beijing has been willing to allow the Organisation of Islamic States to take the lead in weakening the new UN human rights council. This diplomacy has been effective—contributing to a big fall in US influence: in 1995 the US won 50.6 per cent of the votes in the UN general assembly; by 2006, the figure had fallen to just 23.6 per cent. On human rights, the results are even more dramatic: China’s win-rate has rocketed from 43 per cent to 82 per cent, while the US’s has tumbled from 57 per cent to 22 per cent. “It’s a truism that the security council can function only insofar as the US lets it,” says James Traub, UN correspondent of the the New York Times. “The adage may soon be applied to China as well.”
The debate between Chinese intellectuals will continue to swirl within think tanks, journals and universities and—on more sensitive topics—on the internet. Chinese thinkers will continue to act as intellectual magpies, adapting western ideas to suit their purposes and plundering selectively from China’s own history. As China’s global footprint grows, we may find that we become as familiar with the ideas of Zhang Weiying and Wang Hui, Yu Keping and Pan Wei, Yan Xuetong and Zheng Bijan as we were with those of American thinkers in previous decades; from Reaganite economists in the 1980s to the neoconservative strategists of the 9/11 era.
China is not an intellectually open society. But the emergence of freer political debate, the throng of returning students from the west and huge international events like the Olympics are making it more so. And it is so big, so pragmatic and so desperate to succeed that its leaders are constantly experimenting with new ways of doing things. They used special economic zones to test out a market philosophy. Now they are testing a thousand other ideas—from deliberative democracy to regional alliances. From this laboratory of social experiments, a new world-view is emerging that may in time crystallise into a recognisable Chinese model—an alternative, non-western path for the rest of the world to follow.
Tópicos para estudo do Itamaraty
ANEXO
PORTUGUÊS (Primeira e Segunda Fases): 1 Língua Portuguesa: modalidade culta usada contemporaneamente no Brasil. 1.1 Sistema gráfico: ortografia, acentuação e pontuação; legibilidade. 1.2 Morfossintaxe. 1.3 Semântica. 1.4 Vocabulário. 2 Leitura e produção de textos. 2.1 Compreensão, interpretação e análise crítica de textos em língua portuguesa. 2.2 Conhecimentos de Lingüística, Literatura e Estilística: funções da linguagem; níveis de linguagem; variação lingüística; gêneros e estilos textuais; textos literários e não-literários; denotação e conotação; figuras de linguagem; estrutura textual. 2.3 Redação de textos dissertativos dotados de fundamentação conceitual e factual, consistência argumentativa, progressão temática e referencial, coerência, objetividade, precisão, clareza, concisão, coesão textual e correção gramatical. 2.3.1 Defeitos de conteúdo: descontextualização, generalização, simplismo, obviedade, paráfrase, cópia, tautologia, contradição. 2.3.2 Vícios de linguagem e estilo: ruptura de registro lingüístico, coloquialismo, barbarismo, anacronismo, rebuscamento, redundância e linguagem estereotipada.
Bibliografia obrigatória: ANDRADE, Carlos Drummond de. Claro Enigma.
ASSIS, Machado de. Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas. FREYRE, Gilberto. Casa
Grande & Senzala. FURTADO, Celso. Formação Econômica do Brasil. HOLANDA,
Sérgio Buarque de. Visão do Paraíso. PRADO Jr., Caio. Formação do Brasil
Contemporâneo. RAMOS, Graciliano. Vidas Secas. —. São Bernardo. RIBEIRO, Darcy.
O Povo Brasileiro: A formação e o sentido do Brasil.
HISTÓRIA DO BRASIL (Primeira e Terceira Fases): 1 O período colonial. A Configuração Territorial da América Portuguesa. O Tratado de Madri e Alexandre de Gusmão. 2 O processo de independência. Movimentos emancipacionistas. A situação política e econômica européia. O Brasil sede do Estado monárquico português. A influência das idéias liberais e sua recepção no Brasil. A política externa. O Constitucionalismo português e a Independência do Brasil. 3 O Primeiro Reinado (1822-1831). A Constituição de 1824. Quadro político interno. Política exterior do Primeiro Reinado. 4 A Regência (1831-1840). Centralização versus Descentralização: reformas institucionais. (o Ato Adicional de 1834) e revoltas provinciais. A Dimensão Externa. 5 O Segundo Reinado (1840-1889). O Estado centralizado; mudanças institucionais; os partidos políticos e o sistema eleitoral; a questão da unidade territorial. Política externa: as relações com a Europa e Estados Unidos; questões com a Inglaterra; a Guerra do Paraguai. A questão da
escravidão. Crise do Estado Monárquico. As questões religiosa, militar e abolicionista.
Sociedade e Cultura: população, estrutura social, vida acadêmica, científica e literária.
Economia: a agroexportação; a expansão econômica e o trabalho assalariado; as políticas
econômico-financeiras; a política alfandegária e suas conseqüências. 6 A Primeira
República (1889-1930). A proclamação da República e os governos militares. A
Constituição de 1891. O regime oligárquico: a “política dos estados”; coronelismo; sistema
eleitoral; sistema partidário; a hegemonia de São Paulo e Minas Gerais. A economia agro-
exportadora. A crise dos anos 1920: tenentismo e revoltas. A Revolução de 1930. A política
externa: a obra de Rio Branco; o panamericanismo; a II Conferência de Paz da Haia (1907);
o Brasil e a Grande Guerra de 1914; o Brasil na Liga das Nações. Sociedade e cultura: o
Modernismo. 7 A Era Vargas (1930-1945). O processo político e o quadro econômico
financeiro. A Constituição de 1934. A Constituição de 1937: o Estado Novo. O contexto internacional dos anos 1930 e 1940; o Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Industrialização
e legislação trabalhista. Sociedade e cultura. 8 A República Liberal (1945-1964). A nova
ordem política: os partidos políticos e eleições; a Constituição de 1946. Industrialização e
urbanização. Política externa: relações com os Estados Unidos; a Guerra Fria; a “Operação
Panamericana”; a “política externa independente”; o Brasil na ONU. Sociedade e cultura. 9
O Regime Militar (1964-1985). A Constituição de 1967 e as modificações de 1969. O
processo de transição política. A economia. Política externa: relações com os Estados
Unidos; o “pragmatismo responsável”; relações com a América Latina, relações com a
África; o Brasil na ONU. Sociedade e cultura. 10 O processo democrático a partir de 1985.
A Constituição de 1988. Partidos políticos e eleições. Transformações econômicas.
Impactos da globalização. Mudanças sociais. Manifestações culturais. Evolução da política
externa. Mercosul. O Brasil na ONU.
HISTÓRIA MUNDIAL (Primeira Fase): 1. Estruturas e idéias econômicas. Da Revolução
Industrial ao capitalismo organizado: séculos XVIII a XX. Características gerais e
principais fases do desenvolvimento capitalista (desde aproximadamente 1780). Principais
idéias econômicas: da fisiocracia ao liberalismo. Marxismo. As crises e os mecanismos
anti-crise: a Crise de 1929 e o “New Deal”. A prosperidade no segundo pós-guerra. O
“Welfare State” e sua crise. O Pós-Fordismo e a acumulação flexível. 2. Revoluções. As
revoluções burguesas. Processos de independência na América. Conceitos e características
gerais das revoluções contemporâneas. Movimentos operários: luditas, cartistas e “Trade
Unions”. Anarquismo. Socialismo. Revoluções no século XX: Rússia e China. Revoluções
na América Latina: os casos do México e de Cuba. 3. As Relações Internacionais.Modelos
e interpretações. O Concerto Europeu e sua crise (1815-1918): do Congresso de Viena à
Santa Aliança e à Quádrupla Aliança, os pontos de ruptura, os sistemas de Bismarck, as
Alianças e a diplomacia secreta. As rivalidades coloniais. A Questão Balcânica (incluindo
antecedentes e desenvolvimento recente). Causas da Primeira Guerra Mundial. Os 14
pontos de Wilson. A Paz de Versalhes e a ordem mundial resultante (1919-1939). A Liga
das Nações. A “teoria dos dois campos” e a coexistência pacífica. As causas da Segunda
Guerra Mundial. As conferências de Moscou, Teerã, Ialta, Potsdam e São Francisco e a
ordem mundial decorrente. Bretton Woods. O Plano Marshall. A Organização das Nações
Unidas. A Guerra Fria: a noção de bipolaridade (de Truman a Nixon). Os conflitos
localizados. A “détente”. A “segunda Guerra Fria” (Reagan-Bush). A crise e a
desagregação do bloco soviético. 4. Colonialismo, imperialismo, políticas de dominação. O
fim do colonialismo do Antigo Regime. A nova expansão européia. Os debates acerca da
natureza do Imperialismo. A partilha da África e da Ásia. O processo de dominação e a
reação na Índia, China e Japão. A descolonização. A Conferência de Bandung. O Não-
Alinhamento. O conceito de Terceiro Mundo. 5. A evolução política e econômica nas
Américas. A expansão territorial nos EUA. A Guerra de Secessão. A constituição das
identidades nacionais e dos Estados na América Latina. A doutrina Monroe e sua aplicação.
A política externa dos EUA na América Latina. O Pan-Americanismo. A OEA e o Tratado
do Rio de Janeiro. As experiências de integração nas Américas. 6. Idéias e regimes
políticos. Grandes correntes ideológicas da política no século XIX: liberalismo e
nacionalismo. A construção dos Estados nacionais: a Alemanha e a Itália. Grandes
correntes ideológicas da política no século XX: democracia, fascismo, comunismo.
Ditaduras e regimes fascistas. O novo nacionalismo e a questão do fundamentalismo
contemporâneo. O liberalismo no século XX. 7. A vida cultural. O movimento romântico.
A cultura do imperialismo. As vanguardas européias. O modernismo. A pós-modernidade.
GEOGRAFIA (Primeira e Terceira Fases): 1 Conceitos e teorias da Geografia. 1.1 Espaço,
território, região, lugar e paisagem: conceituação. 1.2 Meio ambiente e desenvolvimento
sustentável: conceituação. 1.3 As teorias geográficas da relação sociedade/natureza. 1.4 O
campo geográfico: divisões e interfaces. 2 A formação territorial do Brasil. 2.1
Macrodivisão natural do espaço brasileiro (relevo, clima, vegetação, hidrografia). 2.2 Os
grandes eixos de ocupação do território e a cronologia do processo de formação territorial.
2.3 A cartografia e a definição das fronteiras do Brasil. 2.4 A estruturação da rede de
cidades no Brasil e os processos recentes de urbanização. 2.5 O processo de
industrialização e as tendências atuais da localização das indústrias no Brasil. 2.6 O
processo de modernização da agricultura no Brasil e suas tendências atuais. 2.7
Regionalização e divisão inter-regional do trabalho no Brasil. 3 O Brasil no contexto
geopolítico mundial. 3.1 O processo de mundialização da economia e a divisão
internacional do trabalho: globalização e periferia na atualidade. 3.2 Herança colonial,
condição periférica e industrialização tardia: a América Latina. 3.3 A globalização e a
América do Sul na nova ordem política internacional. 3.4 A questão ambiental no Brasil e
os desafios do desenvolvimento sustentável. 3.5 Os ecossistemas brasileiros e as principais
causas de sua degradação. 3.6 Perspectivas de integração nas bacias do rio da Prata e do rio
Amazonas. 3.7 Os fluxos e redes transnacionais e o território brasileiro. 4 Temas de
Geografia contemporânea. 4.1 Soberania, identidade nacional e multiculturalismo. 4.2
Geografia da População: migrações e direitos humanos. 4.3 Degradação ambiental e gestão
de recursos naturais. 4.4 Desigualdades sociais e padrões de consumo no mundo atual. 4.5
Conflitos geopolíticos contemporâneos.
POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL (Primeira e Terceira Fases): 1. Relações internacionais:
conceitos básicos, atores, processos, instituições e principais paradigmas teóricos. 2. A
política externa brasileira: evolução desde 1945, principais vertentes e linhas de ação. 3. O
Brasil e a América do Sul. Mercosul. 4. A política externa argentina. A Argentina e o
Brasil. 5. A política externa norte-americana e relações com o Brasil. 6. Relações do Brasil
com os demais países do hemisfério. 7. Política externa francesa e relações com o Brasil. 8.
Política externa inglesa e relações com o Brasil. 9. Política externa alemã e relações com o
Brasil. 10. A União Européia e o Brasil. 11. Política externa russa e relações com o Brasil
12. A África e o Brasil. 13. A política externa da China, da Índia e do Japão; relações com
o Brasil. 14. Oriente Médio: a questão palestina; Iraque; Irã. 15. A Comunidade dos Países
de Língua Portuguesa. 16. O Brasil e o projeto de área de livre comércio das Américas
(ALCA). 17. A agenda internacional e o Brasil: 17.1 Desenvolvimento; 17.2 Pobreza e
ações de combate à fome; 17.3 Meio ambiente; 17.4 Direitos Humanos; 17.5 Comércio
internacional e Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC); 17.6 Sistema financeiro
internacional; 17.7 Desarmamento e não-proliferação; 17.8 Terrorismo; 17.9 Narcotráfico;
17.10 A reforma das Nações Unidas.
INGLÊS (Primeira e Terceira Fases): 1 Redação em língua inglesa: expressão em nível
avançado; domínio da gramática; qualidade e propriedade no emprego da linguagem;
organização e desenvolvimento de idéias. 2 Versão do Português para o Inglês: fidelidade
ao texto-fonte; respeito à qualidade e ao registro do texto-fonte; correção morfossintática e lexical. 3 Tradução do Inglês para o Português: fidelidade ao texto-fonte; respeito à
qualidade e ao registro do texto-fonte; correção morfossintática e lexical.
NOÇÕES DE DIREITO E DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO (Primeira e
Terceira Fases): I – Noções de direito e ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. 1 Normas
jurídicas. Características básicas. Hierarquia. 2 Constituição: conceito, classificações,
primado da Constituição, controle de constitucionalidade das leis e dos atos normativos. 3
Fatos e atos jurídicos: elementos, classificação e vícios do ato e do negócio jurídico.
Personalidade jurídica no direito brasileiro. 4 Estado: características, elementos, soberania,
formas de Estado, confederação, república e monarquia, sistemas de governo
(presidencialista e parlamentarista), estado democrático de direito. 5 Organização dos
poderes no direito brasileiro. 6 Processo legislativo brasileiro. 7 Princípios, direitos e
garantias fundamentais da Constituição Federal de 1988 (CF/88). 8 Noções de organização
do Estado na CF/88: competências da União, dos Estados-membros e dos municípios;
características do Distrito Federal. 9 Atividade administrativa do Estado brasileiro:
princípios constitucionais da administração pública e dos servidores públicos, controle de
legalidade dos atos da Administração. 10 Responsabilidade civil do Estado no direito
brasileiro. II – Direito internacional público. 1 Caráter jurídico do direito internacional
público (DIP): fundamento de validade da norma jurídica internacional; DIP e direito
interno; DIP e direito internacional privado (Lei de Introdução ao Código Civil). 2 Fontes
do DIP: Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça (artigo 38); atos unilaterais do Estado;
decisões de organizações internacionais; normas imperativas (jus cogens). 3 Sujeitos do
DIP: Estados [conceito; requisitos; território; população (nacionalidade, condição jurídica
do estrangeiro, deportação, expulsão e extradição); governo e capacidade de entrar em
relações com os demais Estados; surgimento e reconhecimento (de Estado e de governo);
sucessão; responsabilidade internacional; jurisdição e imunidade de jurisdição; diplomatas
e cônsules: privilégios e imunidades]; organizações internacionais (definição, elementos
constitutivos, classificação, personalidade jurídica), Organização das Nações Unidas
(ONU); Santa Sé e Estado da Cidade do Vaticano; Indivíduo. 4 Solução pacífica de
controvérsias internacionais (artigo 33 da Carta da ONU): meios diplomáticos, políticos e
jurisdicionais (arbitragem e tribunais internacionais). 5 Direito internacional dos direitos
humanos: proteção (âmbito internacional e regional); tribunais internacionais; direito
internacional humanitário; direito do refugiado. 6 Direito da integração: noções gerais;
MERCOSUL e União Européia (gênese, estrutura institucional, solução de controvérsias).
7 Direito do comércio internacional: conhecimentos elementares; Organização Mundial do
Comércio (gênese, estrutura institucional, solução de controvérsias). 8 Cooperação jurídica
internacional em matéria penal.
NOÇÕES DE ECONOMIA (Primeira e Terceira Fases): 1. Noções de Microeconomia.
1.1. Demanda do Consumidor. Preferências. Curvas de indiferença. Restrição orçamentária.
Equilíbrio do consumidor. Mudanças de equilíbrio, efeito-preço, efeito-renda e efeito-
substituição. Taxa marginal de substituição. Curva de demanda. Deslocamento da curva e
ao longo da curva. Elasticidade-preço e elasticidade-renda. Classificação de bens.
Excedente do consumidor. 1.2. Oferta do Produtor. Fatores de produção. Função de
produção. Isoquantas. Elasticidade-preço da oferta. Rendimentos de fator. Rendimentos de
escala. Custos de produção. Excedente do produtor. 1.3. Concorrência Perfeita, Monopólio,
Concorrência Monopolística e Oligopólio. Comportamento das empresas. Determinação de preços e quantidades de equilíbrio. 1.4. Comércio internacional e política comercial.
Teorias clássicas. Vantagens absolutas e comparativas. Efeitos de tarifas, quotas e outros
instrumentos de política governamental. Pensamento neoclássico e liberalismo comercial.
A crítica de Prebisch e da Cepal. 2. Noções de Macroeconomia. 2.1. Contabilidade
Nacional. Os conceitos de Produto e Renda Interna, Produto e Renda Nacional, Renda
Disponível Bruta, Poupança Bruta Doméstica e capacidade ou necessidade de
Financiamento Externo. Conceitos e cálculo do Déficit Público. A Conta de Balanço de
Pagamentos: estrutura e cálculo do resultado do Balanço. Números Índices. Deflator
Implícito e Índices de Preço ao Consumidor. 2.2. Evolução do pensamento
macroeconômico. Keynesianismo, monetarismo e escolas posteriores. 2.3. Funções da
moeda. Criação e distribuição de moeda. Oferta da moeda e mecanismos de controle.
Procura da moeda. Papel do Banco Central. Moeda e preços no longo prazo. 2.4.
Flutuações econômicas no curto prazo. Oferta e demanda agregadas. Papel das políticas
monetária e fiscal. Inflação e desemprego. 2.5. Noções de macroeconomia aberta. Os fluxos
internacionais de bens e capital. Taxa de câmbio nominal e real. Taxas de juros. 3.
Economia Brasileira. 3.1. Políticas econômicas e evolução da economia brasileira na
Primeira República. 3.2. A crise de 1929 e a industrialização brasileira na década dos trinta.
O impacto da Segunda Guerra sobre a economia brasileira e os desdobramentos
subseqüentes. 3.3. A Nova Fase de Industrialização. O Plano de Metas. 3.4. O Período
1962-1967. A desaceleração no crescimento. Reformas no sistema fiscal e financeiro.
Políticas antiinflacionárias. Política salarial. 3.5. A Retomada do Crescimento 1968-1973.
A desaceleração e o segundo PND. 3.6. A crise dos anos oitenta. A interrupção do
financiamento externo e as políticas de ajuste. Aceleração inflacionária e os planos de
combate à inflação. 3.7. Os anos noventa. Abertura comercial e financeira. A indústria, a
inflação e o balanço de pagamentos. 3.8. Pensamento econômico e desenvolvimentismo no
Brasil.
ALEMÃO (Quarta Fase): A prova de Alemão constará de questões de compreensão de
texto(s), em língua alemã, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser em
língua alemã. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção gramatical; b)
compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d) qualidade da
linguagem.
ÁRABE (Quarta Fase): A prova de Árabe constará de questões de compreensão de texto(s),
em língua árabe, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser em língua
árabe. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção gramatical; b)
compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d) qualidade da
linguagem.
CHINÊS (Quarta Fase): A prova de Chinês (Mandarim) constará de questões de
compreensão de texto(s), em Mandarim, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão
também ser em Mandarim. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção
gramatical; b) compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d)
qualidade da linguagem.
ESPANHOL (Quarta Fase): A prova de Espanhol constará de questões de compreensão de
texto(s), em língua espanhola, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser
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em língua espanhola. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção
gramatical; b) compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d)
qualidade da linguagem.
FRANCÊS (Quarta Fase): A prova de Francês constará de questões de compreensão de
texto(s), em língua francesa, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser em
língua francesa. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção gramatical; b)
compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d) qualidade da
linguagem.
JAPONÊS (Quarta Fase): A prova de Japonês constará de questões de compreensão de
texto(s), em língua japonesa, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser
em língua japonesa. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção
gramatical; b) compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d)
qualidade da linguagem.
RUSSO (Quarta Fase): A prova de Russo constará de questões de compreensão de texto(s),
em língua russa, sobre tema da atualidade. As respostas deverão também ser em língua
russa. A avaliação se pautará pelos seguintes critérios: a) correção gramatical; b)
compreensão textual; c) organização e desenvolvimento de idéias; d) qualidade da
linguagem.
